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Abstract 
Much of human existence is mediated through, if not outright dependent on, technology. 
This includes our experience of space, not as a scientifically quantified structure 
containing all things, but rather as a region of action and perception. What I shall call 
lived space arises through activity and perception in the world; it is thus the result of a 
constitutive act and not something pre-existing 'out there' in the world. Technology is a 
way to perceive and act in the world, thus the technology that is available will determine 
in part how lived space is constituted. But the human is not simply a disinterested user of 
technology as a tool. There is a feedback effect, whereby the self is shaped through its 
encounter with technology. By exploring Heideggerian phenomenology of space and 
technology, I will thus argue that space and self are structured by technology. 
Ill 
Acknowledgments 
If, as Cephal us suggests, justice consists in paying one's debts, I hope that these 
thank-yous and acknowledgments do justice to the many people to whom I owe a great 
deal. I would never have been able to produce this work if not for their care, attention, 
assistance, and support. 
I thank the Philosophy department at Memorial for the many opportunities, both 
formal and informal, for debate, discussion, and the development of my ideas and myself. 
I thank especially my supervisor, David Thompson. His patience, thoughtfulness, insight, 
and especially his always extensive and precise feedback have been invaluable in helping 
me find my way. I thank the School of Graduate Studies at Memorial for financial 
assistance as well as Melanie, Jenny, and Vince from the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Heritage Web Site Project for continued employment opportunities. 
I am lucky to have many great friends and colleagues, both to distract me from 
my work as well as to discuss it. Thanks to all my fellow students, past and present, who 
have shared their time, ideas, and inspiration. Thanks to my friends for the countless 
hours of laughter, frivolity, and companionship. Special thanks to my good friend Dave 
Lane for bringing many intriguing documentaries and ideas to my attention and for 
vigorously discussing them with me. 
Finally, my biggest thanks goes to my biggest supporters, my parents, for the 
material and efficient causes of my existence, but more for the unconditional love I have 
always received from them. I am truly lucky to have such fine parents. 
IV 
Introduction 
This thesis seeks to explore the question: How are we in the world? I will be 
investigating two modes of being-in-the-world: 1) the spatial and 2) the technological. 
There are complementary modes of being-in-the-world that I will not be discussing; time, 
for example, is the logical companion to space, but my focus is by necessity limited to 
these two. 
I will be proposing a scheme that relates the self to the world, via space and 
technology. That is: 
Dasein 
{self- space/technology- world} 
As Heidegger describes it, 
Self and world belong together in the single entity, Dasein. Self and world are not 
two entities, like subject and object. .. but self and world are the basic 
determination of Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world. 
(Heidegger, Basic Problems 297) 
What is it, then, that brings about this unity? In other words, what is it to be a self and to 
have a world? Or, again, what is it to be present? I believe that space is what gives us a 
world, and the kind of space we experience determines the type of world we have and the 
type of beings that we are. Space arises from the set of possibilities for action that we 
have. Largely these possibilities are decided by biology: we see a certain spectrum of 
"visible" light, hear a certain range of frequencies, we walk upright and we enjoy 
wonderfully dexterous hands and digits. But the list of evolutionary gifts that we enjoy 
does not include a host of abilities enjoyed by other species, abil ities that give those 
creatures a very different space and 'self (though it is hard to say that a flower or ant is a 
self). 
Space is thus one of the central stmctures of being-in-the-world. To have an 
object or world is to have space between you and that object, to be able to differentiate 
between self and object (remembering that self and world both part of the same 
stmcture). But to have an object is also for it to be subject to your actions, for it to be 
present, close by, or available. One way to do this is through technology. 
As a preliminary foray into the discussion, consider: I can reach out and grasp an 
object, say a hammer or a glass of water. Ifthese objects can carry action significance 
Heidegger refers to them as available or ready-to-hand [Zuhandenheit] and not merely 
occurent or present-at-hand [Vorhandenheit]. As technologies, they operate within my 
sphere of reach to make a world of a certain character--one that is hammerable and 
drinkable. The hammer creates a relationship to nails (and so the joke: When all you've 
got is a hammer, everything looks like a nail). The technological aspect of the hammer is 
not the fact that it is a gadget, that it was created by humans to effect our ends; rather, it 
is its ability to create relationships, to make sense of my desire to connect blocks of 
wood. Indeed, in part it creates the very conditions for which I even have a desire to do 
so. The technology of hammering establishes the relationship between wood and nails, 
me and a shelter, that opens up a field of space in which I can be a carpenter and live in a 
wooden house. We therefore make objects and the world present to us through 
technological means; technology describes the structural relationship between the self 
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and object. So the type of technology we have determines the type of space we have and 
the kinds of objects that can be made present to us (and vice-versa: the objects that we 
can be present to). 
In order to elaborate this relationship, the plan of the thesis will be as follows: 
Chapter one will develop the definition of space I will be working with. I will be 
comparing what I call a scientific definition of space, which treats mainly with 
measurable and measured quantities, with lived space, a phenomenological, Heideggerian 
concept of space as network of interests and action. It is my contention in this chapter 
that ultimately, lived space is a component or way of being-in-the-world. 
The aim of chapter two is first to give a definition of technology. I begin with 
some "misunderstandings," some common views that name only a small part of what 
technology is and does. My goal is to broaden the reader's understanding of what counts 
as technology: not just the obvious high-tech gadgetry of modem life, but the material 
world we surround ourselves with, the organizational structures of society, and the 
technical knowledge we possess. My second and chief objective of this chapter is to 
deepen the reader's understanding of technology. Heidegger's seminal thought and 
writing on technology point the way to a new theory of technology: It is a way of life, a 
world. 
Finally, in chapter three, I will bring space and technology together, 
demonstrating that they are both components of being-in-the-world. (The above diagram 
of Oasein is meant to illustrate this relationship.) Not only this, technology affects space 
as a mode of being, in turn deeply affecting our own being. 
3 
Chapter 1 
Scientific and Lived Space: 
Descartes, Newton, Kant, Heidegger 
In this chapter I will be contrasting two different theories of space, their relation, 
and their comparative priority to one another. These two types of space are what I will be 
calling lived space and scientific space. Scientific space is a very familiar concept to most 
people since the Modern era. Starting with Descartes, through Newton, and Kant, there is 
now a well-established tradition of treating scientific space as primary, as ' the way the 
world is.' It is as if, through scientific methodology, we can get a glimpse of the world, 
measure it, map and plot it on a Cartesian coordinate system. Newton himself believed 
that space was a homogenous whole, that seeing space scientifico-mathematically was 
like achieving God 's perspective. Space in effect exists in God 's omnipresence, his being 
everywhere. Newton did, however, believe that a distinction existed between the true 
quantities of space and our measurement of these true and absolute quantities with 
absolute space being invisible to the senses. Nevertheless, his theory rests on a belief that 
true, that is, scientific knowledge, is based on our ability to measure and quantify the 
world around us. This quantification is a main feature ofNewtonian science and science 
in general. Subjective, qualitative feelings and evaluations are superseded by 'objective' 
(and, it is presumed, more accurate) measured quantities. 
In contrast, there is lived space, given to us in the phenomenological tradition. 
Starting with Husser!, moving to Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, there is an increased 
emphasis on the importance of the lived body as constitutive of experience, especially 
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space. Descartes is generally blamed for a stark division between the mind and the body; 
his philosophy gives pre-eminence to the mind as the seat of the self. Soul and mind are 
essentially interchangeable for Descartes, with the mind or soul animating the body as a 
'ghost in the machine.' In contrast, phenomenology's suppositionless starting position 
will lead us to the world as we experience it, theory-free. One conclusion arrived at, 
contra Descartes, is that we experience the world, not as minds trapped in bodies, but 
from the perspective of the lived body. The work of such phenomenologists as Husser! 
and especially Merleau-Ponty enforces the importance of our embodied experience and 
brings a unity to mind and body, rather than disparaging or dismissing the body's 
contribution to the self. 
Indeed, it is in Heidegger that I find the most convincing alternative to the 
scientific account of space, and this is in large part due to his compelling, if not overt, 
treatment of the body. More accurately, Heidegger is concerned with our very mode of 
being, what he calls Dasein. This technical term does not specifically refer to a particular 
embodied perspective, but rather to the system and structure by which we exist and act in 
the world. 
I will thus explore both conceptions of space, especially as they apply to human 
experience. I am not championing one over the other, lived space over scientific space; 
rather my goal is to highlight the primacy of lived space as we encounter it in the world. 
That is, our primary mode or experience of space is not measured, homogenous, scientific 
space, but a much more immediate, non-reflective, experiential space, defined by our 
embodied nature. As such, it is subject to change (through technology, for example). This 
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is not to say that it is a ' better' way of structuring space, that it trumps scientific space. 
However, as far as embodied human experience and the phenomenological perspective 
go, scientific space is necessarily secondary to our primary mode of experiencing space 
as embodied beings. It is only after we perceive and act in lived-space that we can 
abstract from it and make a science of it. The function of this chapter is thus to establish 
an understanding of lived-space such that, in terms of my overall project, I will be able to 
demonstrate how technology dramatically shapes our spatiality. 
While the concept of space has had many important philosophers debating its 
nature, I will not attempt here to give a comprehensive account of this long history. I will 
begin with an explanation of scientific space, using especially a Newtonian-Cartesian 
formulation. I will then proceed to something of a halfway point between Newton's 
absolute space and Heidegger's action space, that is, Kant's peculiar notion of space as a 
category of the intuition. Finally, I will arrive at the crux of the chapter, with the 
phenomenologist Martin Heidegger's quite different theory of space and his introduction 
of the concept of Dasein. There is a crucially important role for the body, or embodied 
being, in this theory, and space is seen not primarily as an abstract theoretical entity but 
as a component of daily life, revealed through normal experience. 
1.1 Scientific Space- Descartes and Newton 
In the Scholiurn to the Principia Mathematica, Newton supplies definitions for 
space, time, place, and motion. These definitions did not appear in the first edition of this 
work as Newton believed such definitions were not necessary, the concepts being "well 
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known to all" (Newton, "Absolute" 322). In the second edition however, Newton 
provides them for clarification purposes. He realised that "common people" have a 
specific conception of space and time, one that is limited to them as sensible objects. This 
is not the scientific-mathematical sense that Newton was concerned with, and thus his 
stipulations in the Scholium. 1 
The definition of space which Newton gives is part of a tradition starting with the 
ancient Greeks and extending through the Middle Ages, with some important differences 
(Torretti § 1 ). The main characteristics of Newton's space are that it is boundless, 
quantifiable, contains all things, and is homogenous or uniform. Before Newton, the 
Greeks conceived of the void as a boundless space, but unlike Newtonian space, the void 
was not the 'container' of all things. The void extended endlessly, but existed outside, 
beyond the fixed celestial bodies. It truly was a void, containing nothing. It is in the 
Middle Ages that being the container of all things is added to the concept of space. 
Sixteenth century philosopher Bruno provides a definition of space that concretises the 
then-current thinking: 
Space is a continuous three-dimensional natural quantity, in which the magnitude 
of bodies is contained, which is prior by nature to all bodies and subsists without 
them but indifferently receives them all and is free from the conditions of action 
and passion, unmixable, impenetrable, unshapeable, non-locatable, outside all 
1 Note this division of the "common people's" conception of space and time, which relies on experiential 
sensible knowledge, versus the scientist 's abstract mathematical model. This will become more important 
later in this chapter, as it is exactly the contrast I am elucidating. 
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bodies yet encompassing and incomprehensibly containing them all (Bruno 
quoted in Torretti §1). 
This is the conception of space that Newton inherited, with one important addition. For 
the Greeks, geometry was the study of the relations and properties of figures. Newton, 
following Descartes, conceived of geometry as the science of space. But Descartes 
believed that space was nothing but the extension of body and thus there was no such 
thing as empty space, a container (which leads to certain difficulties in the development 
of physics). Newton used Cartesian coordinate geometry, which distinguishes three 
infinite planes, but he distinguished bodies from the infinite space that contains them. 
Newton therefore added the concept of empty space to Descartes' theory, which was 
devoid of such an idea. 
Three key distinctions that Newton makes in the Scholium are absolute-relative, 
true-apparent, and mathematical-common. In his definition of space, Newton is setting up 
a dichotomy similar to the episteme-doxa debate of philosophy. His goal is to 
differentiate the views of sensible space of the common people from the more accurate 
definition of space of the scientist. Thus, there is absolute, true, and mathematical space 
versus relative, apparent, and common space. True knowledge of space is of absolute 
space and we cannot have sensible perceptions of it; rather we only perceive relative 
positions of bodies in absolute space. Newton thus suggests that we abstract from our 
senses in an effort to "consider things themselves" (Newton, "Absolute" 325). 
Interestingly, Kant, working squarely within a Newtonian framework, places the 
perception and constitution even of space and time within the intellect of the subject as 
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transcendental ego. For Kant, the things in themselves, the noumenal , are thus a-spatia-
temporal, as they exist outside of our phenomenal experience. 
Another important aspect of Newton's theory of space, indeed the grounding of 
this theory, is that space is God' s sensorium. Newton makes this dramatic claim in the 
Opticks, and what exactly he meant by this has been debated since. One plausible 
analysis is that ' sensorium' can be understood as God's presence in the world, that God is 
present at every point in absolute space and every instant. God's utter regularity and 
reliability thus guarantees the same regularity to space and all the laws of nature. This is 
why we can confidently do Newtonian physics, for example, without worrying that the 
gravitational constant will change from moment to moment or from place to place. This 
is not an uncommon move for philosophers of the period. Descartes does the same thing 
in the Meditations when he appeals to God to guarantee the solidity and regularity of the 
world. 
The goal of the Newtonian physicist is thus something akin to achieving a God' s-
eye-view, insofar as God is here characterised as the apotheosis of the rational, 
mathematical physicist. The point of math and physics is to transcend relative, apparent, 
and common sensible perceptions of space and achieve knowledge of the absolute. In this 
respect, the absolutely ideal position from which to 'observe' is from God's perspective, 
which is necessarily non-bodily and for which space appears as it is, uniform. From this 
position, we experience space in its primary mode and, thanks to Descartes, we can map 
it using his three coordinate system. 
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1.2 Kantian Space 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant provides an analysis of space in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant, deeply influenced by Newton, is working in the tradition 
of conceptual ising geometry as the science of space. As such, his motivation is to ground 
geometry as a priori synthetic knowledge. He believes that his account is the only one 
that "makes intelligible the possibility of geometry" as such knowledge (71). As with 
Newton, space is the container of all things for Kant. It is represented to us as "an infinite 
given magnitude" (69). All objects of sensation are necessarily found in this space, 
without exception (67). I quote a passage from the Aesthetic, as it mirrors Bruno' s above: 
[W]e can represent to ourselves only one space; and if we speak of diverse spaces, 
we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Secondly, these 
parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were, 
constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought 
only as in it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the general 
concept of spaces, depends solely on limitations. Hence it fo llows that an a priori, 
and not an empirical, intuition underlies a ll concepts of space (69). 
Here Kant is obviously dealing with space as unified, homogenous, and boundless. It is 
only through the introduction of limitations to the whole of space that we can 
conceptualise figures and objects found w ithin space. Interestingly, Kant diverges from 
Newtonian space in several key ways. First, Kant believes that space (and time as well) is 
not derived from experience. Keeping in mind that Kant wants to ensure the grounding of 
geometry and the other sciences, he must deal with a pri01·is. He thus attributes space to a 
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function of the mind of the transcendental subject. It must be "presupposed" in order for 
there to be any possibility of objects to exist. The relations between my sensations and 
the objects they refer to, and the relations between objects themselves, do not generate or 
provide the idea of space. Space comes before them so that they may be represented to 
me at all. Space is thus a priori for Kant, for although we may be able to abstract all 
objects from space and think it empty, "we cannot represent to ourselves the absence of 
space" (68). 
Kant concludes from this exposition that space is the "subjective condition of 
sensibility." This is an interesting departure from Newton's division of absolute and 
relative, apparent and common. It might be interpreted as Kant doing away with absolute 
space. It is equally plausible that Kant's conception of space is a fusion of ewton's 
perspectives. Space is absolute in its limitless extension and being container of all things, 
but it is grounded and dependent on the observer's experience. Indeed, Kant explicitly 
makes the division of the phenomenal and noumenal realms, stating that "space is not a 
form inhering in things in themselves" (73-74). These things in themselves (the 
noumenal) remain unknown to us, and we have only our sensible represent~tions of them 
(the phenomenal) which by necessity are patiotemporal. The corollary of this is that the 
noumenal world is not spatiotemporal ; as it lies outside the bounds of sense it does not 
come under the intuition. Kant could therefore be read as preserving Newton's absolute 
space, with all its characteristics intact, but translating it into the languagl.! of the 
subjective observer. What is apparent or relative is so by absolute necessity, and to talk of 
actual space, not as we apprehend it, but as it is, is nonsensical. 
II 
Einstein's explanation of space (and time as well) has much in common with 
Kant. The theory of relativity abolishes absolute space and as such it is a dramatic break 
from Newtonian physics. There are no privileged perspectives for Einstein, which led 
him to state, echoing Kant, that "space and time are modes by which we think." 
One last point to consider is what to make of Kant's assertion that "it is solely 
from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things" (71, my 
italics). This certainly seems to be in contradiction to Newton' s assertions about God and 
the project of science. Newton's claim is that space is God's sensorium. Kant is thus 
explicitly contradicting this by calling space a category of human intuition. Presumably, 
God can "see" the things in themselves. But if this is so, God sees them outside of space 
and time. Perhaps a better way of putting it is that God comprehends the noumenal world 
completely, through pure reason (Kant could hardly disagree). In that case, it is hard to 
know how to treat the "God' s sensorium" thesis in Newton. I do not have a definitive 
answer but I suspect it does not much matter. Kant's point was to move space and time 
squarely into the realm ofhuman experience, and I think it is a fruitful and perceptive 
measure. However, Kant is still burdened with the Newtonian model of space, and thus 
human phenomenal space is in fact not much different from Newton ' s absolute space. 
Despite the fact that Kant turns space into a subjective category of the intuition, the 
character of that space is not different from Newton's: it remains boundless, undivided, 
and contains all things. It is not until much later philosophers come along that the initial 
promise of a human-agent-centric space is brought to fruition. 
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1.3 Heidegger and Space 
A quite different way of theorizing space is in what I believe is its primary mode, 
space as we experience it as embodied beings. This is not quite the same claim that Kant 
is making, that we constitute space as a category of our intuition. Kant was still working 
with a Newtonian conception of space and the Cartesian concept of the subject as a 
disembodied cogito, so while the subject indeed constitutes space, this space is still 
absolute, boundless, undivided, and limitlessly extended. As mentioned, Einstein did 
away with these objective qualities of space. However, his theory is still scientific in that 
it relies on abstract theoretical description to explain a component of every day life. The 
point of relativity is to bring to our attention the relative nature of space. But it also 
admits that we only ever experience our own perspective and this requires a 
phenomenological explanation. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger examines the historical and temporal situatedness 
of the existential self. He develops a concept called Dasein, the condition of being-in-the-
world. This is a particular type of being enjoyed by certain entities (humans) whereby 
they disclose their own being and also the being of other entities. A tree therefore is not 
Dasein, because it does not disclose its own being. However, it does exist as part of the 
structure of Dasein, which does not directly translate to 'human being' but encompasses 
the network of objects and interests, the human included. So the tree is part of Dasein in 
that I climb it, bum it for warmth, or use it to build a hut for shelter. 
Spatiality thus takes on a very important role for Heidegger and for this new way 
of looking at existence. There is no separate Cartesian ego inhabiting its own 'place' 
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removed from the world. To be is to be in the world, and this is to be thoroughly ' thrown ' 
into a network of interests, possibilities, and projects. Thus the 'worldhood ' of the world 
is its relatedness to our everyday activities as it is filled with pragmatic concerns of 
human existence (Sheehan §3). The meditating Cartesian who doubts the existence of the 
outside world (even if it is only a methodological tool to ground science) is a ludicrous 
figure for Heidegger. Dasein moves through the world with circumspective care; it does 
not hole itself up in a cabin. The objects of the world (like Descartes' wax) get their 
significance as they relate to human goals, gaining or losing significance as human 
interest changes. Ifl discover that stone makes for a better shelter, then the significance 
of the tree as building material changes. 
Space and spatiality are thus fundamentally important to our mode of being, but in 
an altogether different way than the scientific space of Descartes, Newton, or Kant. The 
space of Dasein is not a boundless, uniform, all-encompassing container, given as 
primary and in which we find ourselves. Measured scientific space is secondary and does 
not explain being-in-the-world. It is an abstraction from what is our primary experience 
of space. I should note here that Dasein is an historical process and thus it has a crucial 
temporal component besides the spatial. There is no doubt that space and time are tightly 
intertwined, and the same observations I make about the former can equally be applied to 
the latter. Time, just as much as space, is subject to modification, and the two inform one 
another: A long trip is both ' long ' in terms of distance travelled and time elapsed. My 
subsequent discussion however will be limited to Heidegger's treatment of space. 
14 
Heidegger bases the spatiality of entities in the environment on the worldhood of 
the world, distinguishing between the available and the occurent (Being and Time 135). 
The occurent would be what Descartes' wax is to him: a geometric solid with a certain 
extension, dimensions, and coordinates in abstract space. That which is available for 
Heidegger is quite different; it has a closeness, not of measured distance, but in terms of 
its possibility of manipulation. Rather than merely occupying a random spatial location, it 
has a place (as in the expression "everything in its place") in that it belongs somewhere in 
a particular arrangement that fulfills a need (136). The classic example from Heidegger is 
the hammer. In his language, it serves as equipment, for hammering nails or tent pegs. 
Thus its measurable spatial coordinates are less important to our goal of hammering than 
its possibilities of manipulation. A perfectly idealised imaginary hammer of optimal 
dimensions is useless for driving nails. I will return to Heidegger's hammer in a moment. 
For now, the more general point is that equipment occupies a region or place that is not 
the same as Newton' s absolute space. The region is the totality ofthat which is within the 
range of possibility, a place for equipment that serves my ends. So, the Renaissance 
guildsman who sleeps on the same table at which he eats and works is always within the 
same position of absolute space. But the region of his workshop may as well be on the 
other side oftown for all the relation it bears to his breakfast space in terms of his 
divergent ends. The world hood of the world thus refers to the world of the agent, just as 
space for a living, engaged Dasein is not a removed theoretical entity. Worldhood refers 
to the 'horizon' (to put it in Husserlian terms) that constitutes the being' s range of 
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interests. Being-in-the-world is having such a horizon that is constituted and changes 
through circumspective action. 
Thus Heidegger gives us three features that being-in-the-world, or Dasein, is not. 
First, as indicated above, it is not being occurent. Secondly, it is not an occurrence at a 
position in space. And third, it is not even Being-ready-to-hand at some place. The first 
two make sense in Heidegger's framework, but the last distinction seems 
counterintuitive. Is this not exactly opposite to what I just said, summarising Heidegger's 
own point? His point here is that Dasein is a network or structure, and thus not strictly 
'placial.' To make sense ofthis we must introduce the peculiar Heideggerian concept of 
deseverance [Ent.Jernung]. To desever is to abolish distance, to make things less remote. 
This does not necessarily translate into bringing them closer in scientific space. Even if 
we only recognise the object's remoteness, we have desevered the ' distance' in this 
recognition. This is the peculiar activity ofDasein that other Being lacks, according to 
Heidegger. "Two points," say a hammer and nail, "merely have a measurable distance 
between them" (Being and Time 139). But Dasein places them and itself within a 
framework (pardon the pun) of house building, where the hammer, nail, wood, and the 
agent operating them act together as parts of a teleological system. The goal is, 
immediately, to drive the nail into the wood, in order to build a shelter and workspace, so 
that the agent has somewhere to sleep and work, so that he or she can eat, so that. .. 
Deseverance is thus the process of making things available and putting them to use. This 
means to bring things within our region, and once again, this is not primarily to bring 
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them within a certain spatial distance to us; the closeness need not be physical (Being and 
Time 140). 
There are many instances of deseverant technologies that operate at great 
distance, in fact whose whole purpose is to act over such spatial distance. As Heidegger 
himself remarks, radio abolishes distance, making information available quickly, across 
short distances. What are the 'distances' of radio we are dealing with? Certainly, a 
measure of the distance from my ear to the radio, from my radio to the radio station's 
antenna, is meaningless. Heidegger is concerned with the human measure of deseverance. 
Therefore, it has little to do with empirical scientific measurement. When asking for 
directions, one might say that the corner store is "a good walk" away (Newfoundlanders 
are notorious for this). Heidegger suggests that even when we do know and give exact 
distances (as was my experience when asking for directions in Germany, interestingly) 
this still relates to the way as Dasein we desever these distances. This is a radical claim, 
as it is counter to anything present in Newton or Descartes. The phenomenological 
experience of walking, driving, or flying an exact measurable distance is something 
distinct from that measure. The 'what itfeels like' of the act is something that cannot be 
captured in the science of measurement. Heidegger's point is that measurable quantities 
are not exhaustive of our primary experience. It could certainly be the case that a 
mountain is eight-thousand metres high, or a marathon twenty-six miles long. But when 
we climb the mountain or run the marathon, the actual experience of the height or the 
length of it is not something that we first express to ourselves in terms of a quantified 
measurement. The measurement of the di stance is thus secondary or peripheral to the 
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central nature of the act. Quantifiable spatiality need not even arise as a component of our 
experience, unless we consciously reflect and impose a system of measurement. It is the 
same with music: the measurement of note values and pitches does not capture the 
experience of actually listening to the piece being performed. 
Another key divergence from Newtonian space is disclosed in the following: 
"What is ready-to-hand in the environment is certainly not present-at-hand for an eternal 
observer exempt from Dasein: but it is encountered in Dasein's circumspectively 
concemful everydayness" (Heidegger, Being and Time 140). This is to say that a being 
'purified' of any spatiotemporal body carmot enter into the same relations of being that 
Dasein enjoys. A model of space (and time) that rests on such an absolute and abstract 
conception is out of touch with the primary, everydayness of things as they are available. 
Newton's God actually misses the structures of significance, the hammer's use as driver 
of nails, as this is something only embodied Dasein can grasp. The available is not 
translated into the language of the occurent; it is simply lost. 
This point is emphasised in Heidegger's discussion of subjectivity and objectivity. 
The subjective is by no means a second-rate way of viewing or experiencing the world as 
compared to the objective. In Newton, this is the exact dichotomy he proposes, with 
relative, common space, space that is sensibly perceived, contrasted with absolute space, 
the space of science and mathematics. Heidegger argues that far from Newton's idea that 
by accessing absolute, objective space we intuit the world as it 'really' is, it is 
subjectivity that uncovers the world at its most real (Being and Time 141 ). When we 
persist in thinking of the world objectively, we lose sight of its primary nature as we 
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experience space as embodied beings. To be sure, Heidegger does not deny that a science 
of space is possible or desirable, only that it is not the primary or most fundamental sense 
of space. It is possible to " lay bare pure homogenous space," which presumably is 
Newton's project (Being and Time 147). But this metrical science of space comes after 
and loses the original quality of circumspective experience. This science of space does 
not deal with places, regions, and the available, but with positions in coordinate space, 
following the Cartesian model. When we measure and abstract from experience, we move 
to a different level or treatment of space, but it is important to remember, as Heidegger 
stresses, that this does not imply we are somehow transcending a corrupted human 
perception in favour of a purer insight. As Robert March remarks, the idea is flawed that 
science and mathematics are getting at Nature as it really is. Much ofNewtonian physics, 
for example, operates on principles that idealise nature, giving us frictionless surfaces, 
infinite planes, and perfectly parallel lines. These conceits are fabrications and 
approximations and should not be thought of as somehow more real than our own 
experience of nature (March 24-25). 
1.4 The Role of the Body 
The here-there dynamic of Dasein is crucial in understanding Heideggerian space, 
and there is a distinction to make between the Husserlian conception of the body and 
Heidegger's treatment. Heidegger was a student ofHusserl's, and as such he borrowed 
many important ideas from his mentor. Husser!, founder of the phenomenological 
movement in philosophy, placed the lived-body of the subject at the zero or null-point of 
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orientation. As I move about and look around, objects in my perceptual field are 
presented to me. The body itself can appear as one of these objects, but not in the exact 
same sense. I can walk around a table, look at it from different angles; importantly, as I 
distance myself from the table, it recedes from my perception, or approaches as I move 
towards it. The body is unique in that it cannot undergo this phenomenal change. This is 
because "my Body is the pennanent null-body, and it can thereby undergo no change in 
horizon but can indeed 'assume any position in space'" (Husser! 273-4). The horizon of 
all objects of perception is constituted by and surrounds my body; my body is thus the 
central point of orientation for all other objects. Out of this centre point, "Objective 
space," as Husser! calls it, unfolds. This space is homogenous, and all points are equal. I 
then move myselfthrough the points of this Objective space, but with my Body as the 
constant null point (265). 
Though influenced by his mentor, Heidegger does away with this concept of the 
body as null point that Husser! developed. When we desever distance, bringing 
something close, we do not mean that we move it to a closer spatial position to the body, 
or as Heidegger calls it, the "I-Thing encumbered with a body" (Being and Time 142). 
For something to be close by is for it to be available, as I have already mentioned. This 
means that the thing is made relevant to concemful being-in-the-world, not that it 
occupies a particular position. Further, as Elmar Holenstein claims, Dasein's own 
position is not truly important as a zero-point of orientation. Dasein " is essentially de-
severance ... it is spatial;" the "here" of Dasein is only relevant or knowable in tem1s of 
the "there" (Heidegger, Being and Time 142). This may sound like it borders on the 
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nonsensical, but only if we are stuck thinking in a Newtonian paradigm of space. 
Heidegger is working with a concept of spatiality that does not plot objects on a grid. The 
activity of deseverance that characterises Dasein is one that gives structure to objects, but 
not by mapping out their position. My "here" is truly "there" in the sense that my 
attention and concern are fixed elsewhere than on myself. When I am looking at the 
clock, the yonder place that Heidegger speaks of is my being at the clock. In other words, 
I am not consciously thinking of my body in its relation to the clock but focusing my 
attention on that object. My goal in reaching for the hammer is the hammer, not to have 
the hammer contiguous (in the scientific sense) with my hand. 
This is an important point that Elmar Holenstein picks up on in "The Zero-Point 
of Orientation: The Placement of the I in Perceived Space." Holenstein agrees with 
Heidegger, though he suggests that the latter does not pursue the point far enough. The 
point of Holenstein's paper is to critique what he sees as several unquestioned and 
untenable suppositions ofHusserl's phenomenology. The main critique is that the thesis 
that the lived-body of the perceiver is always the zero-point of orientation is wrong. In all 
circumstances, the zero-point is "the most powerful figure." This can certainly be the 
lived body in the right context, but that this is so all the time is false (Holenstein 90). The 
lived-body enjoys no special privilege over other objects in orienting the world spatially. 
Holenstein gives two examples. In a darkened room, full of homogenous space, a 
slanted line is projected on the wall; we can easily tilt our heads and make this line 
straight. This is an instance in which Holenstein considers the body the zero-point of 
orientation (61). As he notes, this situation offinding oneself in homogenous space is rare 
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(usually relegated to such experimental apparatuses or Newtonian musings!) The link to 
Newton is fairly obvious. The blackened room represents absolute space, void of objects, 
but existing independently of them. We then insert a) a subject and b) a projected line, 
and see what happens. But Holenstein describes a second, more true-to-life experiment. 
Instead of a single line being projected in the room, we project more familiar images full 
of objects, perhaps a picture of a real room. When these images are slanted, there is a 
strong tendency to see them as vertical: "This tendency is so strong that even the floor, 
upon which the observer is standing, seems to be slanted contrary to the tilted images" 
(Holenstein 78, my emphasis). Holenstein's point is to demonstrate how in this case the 
body is not the zero-point of orientation. In terms of a here-there relationship, the lived-
body accommodates itself to the object of perception. It does not establish itself as a 
privileged point that maps objects in their spatial relation to it; space is always constituted 
as a network with the body and the intentions of the subject. Thus when I find myself in a 
city square, I do not feel that I am at the center, from which the square unfolds. The 
center of the square, with its imposing statue or fountain, is intuited as the center of 
gravity and not my body. Note that this is yet a non-quantitative mapping; it is a 
qualitative feeling that I am not at the center of the scene but at the periphery, oriented 
towards the central point. 
Holenstein thus offers his corrections to Husserl ' s theory. Husser! might be 
thought to be halfway along from escaping Cartesian coordinates by focusing on the 
lived-body as constitutive of space rather than space being a homogenous pre-existing 
whole. But even the zero-point must go as a vestige of this coordinate system. This is the 
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move that Heidegger makes. The difficulty Heidegger has is in avoiding the language of 
spatiality as it is used scientifically to talk about what interests him, the spatiality of 
networks of significance, of places of interest and activity for Dasein. As Holenstein puts 
it, "[t]he subject always already finds itself stretched inside a network of needs that 
attracts it soon over here and then over there" (69). This is where deseverance plays its 
role in eliminating the distances between Dasein and the things it needs to exist. There is 
then no space yet to even fix a zero-point of orientation, be it the lived-body or anything 
else. There is no such thing as "a subject which is proximally still worldless and which 
emits a space out of itself' (Heidegger, Being and Time 146). I think this is the point 
Holenstein would be trying to make, in agreement with Heidegger, if Holenstein were to 
take his argument just one step further: "I am there, outside, with the seen things ... I do 
not experience things as if I were peering out from my dark lived-body like a lighthouse 
guard. Rather I am in space open to all sides, I am presently where my gaze rests" (Zutt, 
quoted in Holenstein 69, my emphasis). The image of the self as a lighthouse keeper 
peering out from the lighthouse of the lived-body is not quite fair to Husser!. But it is an 
apt way to describe the post-Descartes characterisation of the mind and body as two 
distinctly separate entities. 
Above I suggested that Kant's transformation of space into a category of intuition 
can be read as a first step towards making space and spatiality more 'subjective.' I will 
return to this point once more with a fresh perspective gleaned from Heidegger to argue 
against this interpretation. Making space a condition of possible experience which 
belongs to humans and does not exist within the world does not fundamentally change the 
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character of that space. Heidegger refutes Kant entirely on this point, saying that "space 
is not in the subject" (Being and Time 146). Further, the world is also not in space. Space 
in this pre-theoretical sense is what Heidegger calls region, and it is encountered through 
the interaction with the available, as explained above. Thus space does not belong to the 
subject as a priori, in Kant' s sense, because it can only arise where there is 
circurnspective action of Dasein. There is no space existing ' out there,' waiting to be 
filled with objects, nor is there space ' in here,' inside my head so to speak, waiting to be 
applied to the objects of perception. This also means that my body, primarily, is not an 
object plotted in space (though it could be treated as such, as when we make a science of 
human motion). 
1.5 Conclusion 
In Heidegger' s Being and Time, we have a dramatic reconceptualisation of space. 
He rejects a long history of space that starts with the Greeks and sees its culmination in 
the theories ofDescartes and Newton. Indeed, as I have suggested, Heidegger's theory of 
space goes much deeper, in that it explores and explains the very nature of our being as 
Dasein. For Heidegger, it is impossible to disentangle spatiality from existence, to treat it 
as an abstract subject of scientific study. While a science of space is possible it is not a 
study ofDasein's spatiality; we lose the character of the everydayness when we attempt 
such a study. 
Descartes, Newton, and Kant gave us a quantifiable, measurable science of space. 
This was their interest as Modern mathematicians, scientists, and philosophers. But it 
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would be a mistake to suppose that because their conceptualisation of space is presented 
as exact and objective, that it must be true or more accurate than the concept that 
Heidegger later explored. These scientific ideas only arise because of a prior and more 
fundamental experience. This experience of course is the subjective experience of space, 
as Heidegger describes it, whereby we find ourselves (in fact only are ourselves) in a 
network of interests and possibilities. A return to and examination of this type of space is 
thus crucial not only to understanding space as a phenomenon, but to understanding 
ourselves and most importantly for this thesis, understanding how we are affected by 
technology. 
If we dispense with a notion of objective space and come to understand lived 
space as a constitutive act, we must recognise that this lived space is malleable. My 
contention is that what space will be like is going to be powerfully influenced by our 
technology. Thus, we must have a solid understanding of what technology is, and that is 
the function of my next chapter. With a deeper understanding of lived space and 





If an examination of spatiality and its relation to our own human existence is 
essential, then I find it equally crucial that we examine a component of our existence that 
has become inseparable from the everyday; that is, technology. In this chapter, I will thus 
be shifting my focus to address this second main topic. I will not be putting space aside 
altogether; there will be some suggestion as to how the two will be brought together in 
the final chapter, where I will discuss the interrelation of space and technology and the 
powerful effect the latter has on the former. Keeping in mind that this is the ultimate goal, 
I will be tailoring my discussion to those aspects and characteristics of technology that 
most obviously and directly apply to space. I will not be offering a definitive, 
comprehensive, once-and-for-all discussion or explanation of technology - in other 
words, I do not pretend that I will nail down the essence of technology. My belief is that 
defining essences is tricky business and not always fruitful. In this case, my goal is to 
broaden and deepen the reader' s understanding of technology: First, technology is much 
more common than we may first realise, permeating almost every aspect of our existence. 
Secondly, technology places us in certain relations (embodiment and hermeneutic) with 
the world. These relations are non-trivial and are in fact critical in shaping self and world. 
With this understanding of technology, I may bring together space and technology and 
see how the latter impacts our constitution of the former. 
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2.1 What is Technology? 
I will begin by examining and exposing some traditional ways of thinking about 
technology that are not strictly speaking accurate. I will propose and challenge a common 
view of technology as a parallel to the common, scientific view of space we saw in the 
last chapter; the space of Newton and Descartes, which is represented through 
quantification and measurement. I am arguing against the same notion of technology that 
Heidegger challenges, that which he calls the instrumental and anthropological 
explanation. It claims that technology is an ensemble oftools built by humans with the 
purpose of fulfilling a goal (Heidegger, "Question Concerning Technology" 36). It is the 
sort of theory most frequently discovered in popular culture, in magazines and TV shows 
such as Popular Science, Popular Mechanics, and TechTV, and even such august 
publications as the Economist, which publishes quarterly 'technology' updates. It is also 
found in our dictionaries. The three definitions of technology supplied by the OED refer 
to "the study and use of the mechanical arts and applied science ... the application of this 
to practical tasks in industry . .. [and] a tool" used for such purposes. There is here a close 
association between technology and machinery, gadgets, and tools that get stuff done. 
And that is in many ways a sufficient and satisfactory definition. But, as Heidegger 
stresses, it might be correct while not yet being true ("Question Concerning Technology" 
36). In other words, there is nothing incorrect about it per se, but a different definition 
could have more explanatory power. Similarly, a scientific definition and examination of 
space is well and good, so long as we do not Jose sight of the prior nature of space that is 
based in human activity and interest. 
27 
Along these lines, Samuel Ijsseling offers what he terms three 
"misunderstandings" of technology. While I do not necessarily agree that they are 
misunderstandings per se, I do agree with the spirit of ljsseling's singling them out. They 
are ways of thinking about technology that do not lead us to the types of insights that 
emerge when we think about the subject in the manner that I will shortly outline. But for 
now, briefly, the ' misunderstandings:' 
1. Technology is a totality of technical devices. 
2. Technology is applied science. 
3. Technology is something we can use or not use (Ijsseling 410-411). 
The first misunderstanding is what l have referred to above as the 'gadget' definition. 
There are two problems with this definition, one more obvious, the other a little more 
subtle. First, what counts as a "technical device" is very broad, broader indeed than we 
might expect. The clock is technology, or the microwave, the typewriter, the internal 
combustion engine, the cell phone: these are all technical devices. It is not hard to 
convince someone of this. I believe the gadget definition of technology is rooted in our 
contemporary experience of these ever more complex devices, especially electronic ones. 
Laptop computers, PDAs, GPS units - these are all very obviously highly advanced 
technologies. But my pencil (and not necessarily a mechanical pencil) is also a piece of 
technology. So is a nail or a hammer, a hoe, a shovel. The very basic tools of the Stone 
Age, flint axes for example, are also technology in the gadget sense. Our current gadgets 
are simply more refined, more complex, their inner workings more incomprehensible. 
The clock, when it was first introduced, was not the clock we now know. A modem 
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atomic clock subdivides the second into millions of parts. But the first mechanical clocks, 
which can be dated at least back to the thirteenth century, only measured the hour. The 
mechanical clock merely refined fuzzy time-keeping techniques to a greater degree of 
precision. By c.l345, " the division of hours into sixty minutes and of minutes into sixty 
seconds became common" (Mumford 16). Prior to that, the movement of the sun through 
the sky, casting a shadow on a sundial, approximated some sort of hour and even that 
simple sun dial is a technical device. 
The second aspect of the first misunderstanding is this: Even if we broaden the 
concept of what counts as a technical device in this manner, we have yet not broadened it 
enough. I referred to this misunderstanding as the 'gadget' definition because it focuses 
on concrete, material items. But the list of all such technical devices still does not include 
all things that are technology. There are immaterial technologies, technical knowledge, 
organisational structures, that do not refer to things we can see, or touch, or wield. They 
have no buttons or handles, but they are technological. A bureaucracy is an example of 
such an immaterial technology. The workers, offices, and forms filled out in triplicate are 
certainly physical, but the structured hierarchy, standardisation, limited responsibility of 
individuals within the system, and impersonal nature of the dealings of a modem 
bureaucratic system equally qualify it as technology. I will call this sort of technology 
'inconspicuous' and I will return to it shortly. 
Ijsseling's second misunderstanding refers to our experience of technology after 
Modem science, where the two (science and technology) have become almost 
inextricably intertwined ( 411 ). Today, one cannot theorise about sub-atomic particles 
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(science) without smashing atomic nuclei together in massive particle accelerators 
(technology). Nor can we peer into deep-space gathering data about the age and makeup 
of our universe without sophisticated radio and optical telescopes. One of the main 
characteristics of science from the Modern period onwards is that it is so technologised. 
(Some writers refer to the phenomenon of technoscience to highlight this relation). Of 
course, this cuts both ways. Modern technology is highly dependent on advances in 
scientific understanding. We would never have our radio telescopes if we did not 
understand the principles of electro-magnetic waves. Then again, we would not 
understand those if we had no experimental apparatus to detect them. And so it goes, the 
two linked in a mutually inforn1ing and beneficial relation. Technology is therefore no 
more applied science than science is the product of technology. 
But science and technology were not always as closely bound as they are 
nowadays. There were pre-Modern times when "[s]cience [was] not always thought of as 
having necessary or even close relations to technology" (lhde, Philosophy ofTechnology 
3). In the Ancient period, science was rather tied to philosophy; much speculation of 
Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and Democritus, to name a few, was in 
effect questioning Nature itself: What is the nature ofNature? To this they each had 
interesting theories and speculative answers: Air, water, number (Pythagoras), nous, and 
finally, with Democritus, the atom. These ancients were like scientists without 
technology, with no laboratories or experimental apparatuses to test their claims. The 
existence of Democritus' atom had to wait over 2000 years for the technological means 
of its experimental verification. Even more dramatically, despite the fact that "human 
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activity from time immemorial. .. has always been technologically embedded," it is 
without doubt that no scientific theory preceded the very first use of simple hand tools in 
our ancestral past (lhde, Lifeworld 20). 
One may wonder what it matters, to think of technology as inextricably tied to 
science. The point of this examination is to show how many of our ideas and attitudes 
concerning technology are insufficient in that they miss important features of the 
phenomenon. Highlighting the gadget fallacy shows how technology is a lot more 
common and pervasive than we might initially think. We are constantly surrounded by 
technology, even though we might not realise or recognise it. I stress the fact that 
technology is not reducible to or the same thing as applied science for the same reason 
that I argue technology is not a bunch of gadgets, so that we do not lose sight of our 
object and confuse technology with the products of big science. The canal diggers of 
Industrial Revolution-era England were not men of science; they were practical men. 
Their technologies were pragmatic inventions that emerged out of necessity and in 
response to the type of world they lived in. There was no scientific theory behind their 
practices but a need to function with their world. If we treat technology merely as applied 
science, we will miss out on this element of the technological. 
Ijsseling's final misunderstanding is chiefly an ethical one. Technology is not 
neutral. It does not sit inert, waiting to be picked up, put to good or bad use, then set back 
down (Ijsseling 411 ). As Jacques Ellul puts it, "the human being is no longer in any sense 
the agent of choice." A new surgical option merely is; there is no choice (80). We do not 
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walk around in a non-technological world, deciding here to use technology, there, not.2 
Rather, "technology is a world: our world" (Ijsseling 411). And this world 'strives' for 
total efficiency and integration. This is the thesis of the autonomy of technology, and my 
aim here is not to get entangled in it. I will say that I believe the ethical questions 
surrounding technology need to be given long and serious consideration, but that will not 
be the direction of this thesis. What we can take away from this third misunderstanding is 
that technology is in fact our world. One thing that is certainly true today is that we 
cannot decide not to use technology. I sleep in a bed on a mattress, covered in blankets. I 
flick a switch to tum on the lights, bringing electricity into my home. I wash in a 
bathroom full of mirrors, plumbing, and tile work. I prepare breakfast in a kitchen with a 
toaster, microwave oven, refrigerator, and drawers and cupboards full of utensils. Before 
going outside I don my coat, my hat, my boots ... Every single item I have listed is part of 
the technological fabric of my world. One day at work, I might find myself so disgusted 
with the oppressive, total ising character of technology that I decide to rid myself of it 
once and for all. I discard my computer, my car, and my cell phone. I sell my house, my 
bicycle, my guitar. My books better go too, although I'll certainly miss them, not to 
mention my clothes. I walk out into Nature, naked, finally free of the trappings of 
technology. But it is cold, and I am hungry, and it is getting dark. Better build a fire, 
sharpen a stick, set a snare. Some clothes would be nice, maybe made of animal hair, fur, 
or feathers. Of course, a shelter would be ideal, even something as rudimentary as a lean-
to. But wait! I've caught myself falling back into the old trap of technology. As benign as 
2 We might indeed choose to not use a patticular technology or set of technologies, as do the Amish, 
Luddites, hippies, and other groups, but everyone uses some technology. No one lives in the Garden. 
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my simple tools seem, I swore off technology, desperate to avoid the treadmill of 
autonomous technological ' progress' that consumes my 'natural' existence. 
I hope my hypothetical renouncement of technology has shown that to avoid 
technology altogether is truly a monumental feat. In contemporary times, we are literally 
surrounded by it. As I write, I am sitting in a chair, at a computer, in a house, heated by a 
furnace, lit by electricity. But even hundreds or thousands of years ago, ifl were writing 
this same essay, it would hardly be different. Rather than a metal and plastic chair 
produced in a factory, it would be wooden, shaped with hand tools by a carpenter. I 
would write with a quill pen on parchment or perhaps papyrus, sitting in a draughty stone 
house or straw hut. Even the language itself that I use is a form of technology, a complex 
system designed to communicate information. My point is this: If there was a time when 
humans lived in a state of nature, utterly devoid of technology (in the 'Garden,' as Ihde 
imaginatively puts it (Technology and the Lifeworld 12)) it was very short lived indeed. 
Technology is our world. Even such Luddites as Ted Kacyzynski, the infamous 
Unabomber, machined his own screws. 
2.2 Heidegger's 'Question' 
Having gone through these misunderstandings as a means of preliminary 
introduction, let us delve a little deeper into the matter. Heidegger is one of the seminal 
thinkers in the philosophy of technology. His essay, "Question Concerning Technology," 
begins: "In what follows we shall be questioning concerning technology" (35, italics in 
original). In the course of this questioning, Heidegger assures us that unless we realise 
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that "the essence of technology is by no means anything technological," we will be 
forever blind to this "essence" (35). I take this to be at the core ofHeidegger's 
philosophy of technology: "Bringing-forth brings hither out of concealment forth into 
unconcealment," and specifically, "[t]echnology is a way of revealing" (38). Technology 
"reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us" (38). 
Thus, technology is not merely tinkering, producing nicely turned pots out of clay, or 
steam engines out of iron, but a revealing of potentialities and capacities, of "whatever 
can look and turn out now one way and now another" (39). The craftsperson or artisan 
gathers his or her materials and tools, envisions the finished project, and executes it in 
space and time. He or she therefore reveals a potential state or form. 
The essence of technology for Heidegger lies in this revealing. His project is to 
consider the questions and problems of epistemology as ontological, to consider the 
question of Being as it reveals itself in different historical epochs, and to explore the 
revealing-concealing character of truth. Any revealing, any bringing forth into 
unconcealement, necessarily leaves something else hidden or concealed. To ' think 
technologically' or to live in a technological society are very specific modes of being that 
disclose certain features of the world while occluding others (with medical science, the 
death of shamanism, perhaps). Modern technology, according to Heidegger, perverts the 
revealing power of technology by treating the world as standing-reserve [Bestand] 
("Question Concerning Technology" 41 ). By this, Heidegger means that the world is 
revealed to us as a mere store of energy. The mountain is a store of coal, iron ore, and 
uranium; the oceans, a store of fish to be harvested; the Arctic, an untapped oil well. 
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There is thus a fundamental shift, argues Heidegger, in the way modern technology 
reveals the world. We p lace demands on this world to fulfill our hunger for energy and 
resources, driven by a technologically fuelled lust for dominance over Nature.3 There is a 
key difference between building a bridge over the Rhine and damming it with a power 
works: In a devastatingly wry moment, Heidegger answers his critics who might object, 
"But the Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is it not?" To this he replies, 
"Perhaps .. . but in no other way than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group 
ordered there by the vacation industry" ("Question Concerning Technology" 41). 
There is a lot to unpack in Heidegger' s theory of technology. I will begin by 
accusing him of an element of Romanticism, as if building a bridge over the Rhine were a 
pure act of communing with Nature. This is not an uncommon position for many, who, 
when describing mechanised agriculture, for example, turn to violent metaphors to 
describe the ' ripping' and 'slashing' of the soi1.4 These images are absent when 
describing the ox-pulled plough and the hand hoe, despite the fact that the blades of either 
also 'rip' and 'slash' the soil. Romanticism aside, the most interesting aspect of 
Heidegger' s theory is that technology is a revealing. Its concrete manifestations might be 
of objects that are made with purpose to do useful work, but that does not define 
technology' s essence. The instrumental and anthropological definitions of technology are 
indeed correct (" uncannily correct" as Heidegger puts it ("Question Concerning 
Technology" 36)) because they agree with the deeper essence of technology as revealing. 
3 Which perhaps finds its origins in the Bacon ian max ims of mastery over Nature. 
4 
"And all is seared with trade; bleared, smeared with toil; I And wears man's smudge and shares man's 
smell : the soil I Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod." - Gerard Manley Hopkins, "God's Grandeur." 
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The world is revealed to us in a certain way; in this case it is enframed as standing-
reserve, as a resource to be disposed of to fulfill human ends. We produce tools and 
artefacts to effect these ends, and when we abstract from these two components, we 
arrive at a correct instrumental and anthropological definition of technology, built on the 
true essence of technology as a revealing. 
Heidegger's ontology of technology shows, in agreement with ljsseling, that there 
is a deeper dynamic between us and our technology than that of tool user. Technology 
changes revealing and introduces a whole host of possibilities for Dasein: We find 
ourselves as beings with a world. What kind of world is this? It is a spatially structured 
world, as we saw in the first chapter. It is also a world full of technology, not just gadgets 
that we pick up and put down at will, but things that make us and our world possible. 
Since our first use of technology, we continually modify our world but also ourselves as a 
pole of being-in-the-world. Consider the world we find ourselves in today, and as an 
example, the role the technologies of car-culture have played in making it possible. 
The automobi le is not simply a neat gadget, in that it is a discrete thing, a clever 
engineering solution made of myriad specialised parts of various materials, which gets us 
from place to place. First of all , the automobile does not exist in a void. It requires roads 
to drive on, gas stations to fill the tank, an expansive parts industry with manufacturers, 
suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers, not to mention garages and mechanics to keep it 
functioning. It exists, following Ij sseling, Ellul, Ihde, and others, in a totalising system 
that requires a vast network, just so that I may have a car sitting in my driveway. Second, 
there is no denying that the automobile gets me from place to place. But from which and 
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to what place does it get me? In "Auto-Mobility and the Route-Scape," Gary Backhaus 
addresses just this issue. Every technology exacts a price. The gadget definition suggests 
that whether I get to work by foot, by bus, or by car makes no difference: they are simply 
modes of transport. Backhaus points out that they are much more; they are modes of life, 
or I will say, modes of being-in-the-world. 
Above I argued that technology is not an independent gadget and we independent 
users of that gadget. Together with our technology, we form an interconnected whole. 
The car is thus not just another device we employ to move about in our world; it has a 
great impact in determining who we are and what that world is: "[T]he automobile has 
become an aspect of our very own Being, which includes being-with and being-in, for it 
informs the fundamental structures of our experience of the life-world" (Backhaus 97). 
Specifically, "automobile use," Backhaus says, "has led to spatial organizations that level 
the significance of the landscape to that of road-mapping-for-transportation" (101). In its 
negative analysis, automobility treats landscapes as places that need to be paved. 
Destinations are chosen for us in advance by virtue of the fact that we must follow the 
roads. And the nature of these destinations reveals further impacts on our being-in-the-
world; Backhaus is particularly exercised about the phenomenon of suburbanisation and 
consumerism (echoing Heidegger's commentary on the Rhine and the tourist industry) 
( 101 ). The whole structure and spatial demands of car-culture predetermine our choices 
of where to live and shop, if not necessitating, then at least strongly encouraging us to 
drive from our suburban homes to big-box shopping complexes and back. The 
automobile, more accurately, the automobile culture or, even better, world, necessitates a 
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very fixed, definite, and limited set of features. The possibilities opened to me by owning 
a car are in direct relation to the possibilities closed off, and thus the world I live in and 
the space I move through are different if I own a car. 
How is this so? As a car-owner, part of my identity is tied up with the fact that I 
own a car: I am a motorist. I also belong to and identify with a certain socio-economic 
class that is wealthy enough to pay for the vehicle itself, auto insurance, gas, tune-ups, 
etc. I am able to fling myself through space at speeds of a hundred kilometres per hour 
and more. Distance becomes less relevant, as I can easily jump in my vehicle and drive to 
the store or my friend 's house for a visit, something I might have otherwise reserved for 
special occasions ifl had to walk. The ceremony of a visit to a 'distant' (relatively 
speaking) friend changes if I drive there in fifteen minutes or walk there in an hour ("You 
walked all this way to see me?!"). Negatively, I also might find myselfless fit; whereas I 
used to walk and bike everywhere, I now drive. I get far less exercise and burn fewer 
calories. Not only that, it is far easier for me to consume more calories, as the drive-
through of a fast food restaurant is mere minutes and very little effort away. I thus find 
myself getting a little soft around the middle, maybe even obese. I also think differently 
because of this new ease of transport. All my destinations seem much closer now that I 
do not have to walk or wait for the bus. I might fall into the motorist's trap of road-rage: 
everyone is in my way, impeding my easy progress across the pavement. But all is not 
doom and gloom (despite Backhaus' protestations): My life is also richer in ways because 
of my car. I become a member of a motorist society. I enjoy the sheer experience of 
driving, the wind whipping through my hair, the radio blaring. The ability to travel at 
38 
great speed, even if I do not have a destination, is a thrill in itself. I get to visit my friends 
and family more often. I can work in the city but live in the country. There are thus pros 
and cons to any technology. To remain value-neutral, we might just say that every 
technology brings with it certain enabling features, but also problems of compatibility. It 
is difficult for example to reconcile the needs and desires of motorists with those of 
pedestrians or with the exigencies of climate change for that matter. 
Of course, we need not limit ourselves to transport technology, though it is 
obviously related to space. A world with street lamps, be they candle, oil, gas or electric-
powered, is a different world than one without. Street lamps light my way at night. They 
transform dark, potentially dangerous spaces, creating new possibilities. For many years, 
my friends and I played Frisbee in the park from I Opm to 12pm. This would have been 
impossible (or at the least much more difficult and dangerous) without the few lampposts 
lighting our game. Our casual late-night games are a version of the nightly professional 
sporting events held under blaring, many-thousand watt bulbs that transform day into 
night, an unusable baseball field or soccer pitch into a successful venue for professional 
sporting events. Early in our evolutionary history, long before electricity and outdoor 
lighting, fire was our source of light in the dark. A torch would have allowed us to 
explore deep into caves, even to make homes within their dark recesses. A pit fire 
becomes a focal point of activity, and not just for cooking and eating. It creates a warm, 
illuminated, and safe space for our ancestors to gather and share a meal and probably 
tales of the hunt. These various lighting technologies, in similar ways, serve to produce 
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useable space, in the sense that they create the grounds for activities that are otherwise 
impossible. 
It should by now be obvious that far from being a neutral collection of gadgets, 
technology in all its forms has a profound impact on us and our world. What I would 
most like to avoid is a conception that as humans, we have a set of predefined goals that 
we then seek to meet by adopting now this technology, now that. This is certainly a 
potential interpretation, but it does not properly credit the bilateral relationship between 
us and technology. A new technology, like the automobile, creates a brand new set of 
values, possibilities, and interpretations of ourselves and the world. As Jonas asks, "who 
had ever wished to have in his living room the Philharmonic orchestra, or open heart 
surgery, or a helicopter defoliating a Vietnam forest? or to drink his coffee from a 
disposable plastic cup? ... or to see clones of himself and others walking about?" (19). 
Technology compels us to think and act differently, sometimes consciously, sometimes 
unconsciously. It demands a new set of paradigms to explain who we are and what we are 
doing. There is even neurophysiological evidence to support this argument. Dr. Mike 
Merzenich says: 
Our brains are different from those of all humans before us. Our brain is modified 
on a substantial scale, physically and functionally, each time we learn a new skill 
or develop a new ability. Massive changes are associated with our modem 
cultural specializations. The Internet is just one of those things that contemporary 
humans can spend millions of "practice" events at, that the average human a 
thousand years ago had absolutely no exposure to. Our brains are massively 
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remodelled by this exposure--but so, too, by reading, by television, by video 
games, by modern electronics, by contemporary music, by contemporary "tools," 
etc. (quoted in Olsen). 
Imagine a caveman and modern man. They are not the same type of people who happen 
to use different gadgets to achieve their similar ends. They are radically different people 
living in radically different worlds with divergent goals and values. Certainly there are 
very fundamental goals and values that are shared by most humans through time: the 
desire for sustenance, for exan1ple. Even this is not universal, however, as with those who 
are suicidal or want to be euthanized. We might qualify and say that the vast majority of 
people desire sustenance. But it is a gross oversimplification to say that a caveman's 
desire to be fed and my desire to be fed are the same desire. If we are to cash out what it 
actually means to say "I desire to be fed today" in contrast to what the caveman means, 
we see that they are drastically different desires. I desire to get up in the morning, 
rummage through my fridge and cupboards, and produce a meal out of items procured via 
a previous expedition to a nearby grocery store. The caveman gets up in the morning and 
desires to grab his spear, stalk a deer in the woods, and kill, skin cook, and eat it. I have 
never had that desire. 
The difference of goals and values is even more evident when we consider high 
technology. To what end would a caveman employ the Internet? He would not be able to 
put it into action, to make any sense of it. No caveman ever complained about the speed 
of dial-up and wished for broadband access, or more storage space, or that his package 
from Amazon.com would arrive more quickly. Indeed, the Internet could not exist in the 
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caveman's world nor could the caveman exist in the Internet's world. Another way of 
putting it is to say that the Internet cannot be revealed to the caveman or again, is not 
available to him. Self and world are two poles of the same structure and the technological 
developments that allow for the Internet to exist precisely preclude the possibility of 
cavemen. In short, you cannot know what the Internet is, understand it, and use it and still 
be a caveman. Finally, the technologies of the Internet, or automobility, or space travel 
are not just discrete gadgets or artefacts, but encompass non physical systems, structures, 
and knowledge to which the caveman has no access. I will thus suggest in the next 
section that though the physical artefact is the most conspicuous type, there are also non-
material manifestations oftechnology. 
2.3 'Inconspicuous' Technology 
So far, despite my earlier protestations, I have been talking largely about gadget 
technology. But as I mentioned there are other important spheres of technology that are 
not as immediately obvious or concrete as machine technological artefacts. It is my claim 
that humanity and technology are inseparable. Without technology, we do not have the 
equipment to survive in the state of Nature. The creation myth of Prometheus and 
Epimetheus is instructive in this regard, and I introduce it as a way of illustrating some of 
the sweep oftechnology as I will be treating it: Having given out all other gifts to the 
animals, Prometheus steals and gives man the gift of technique to guarantee his survival. 
But the gift of technical knowledge is not enough for man, when it refers only to 
smithing, weaving, spinning, and inventing; in short, mechanical or machine-related 
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technology. Humans also required a socio-political technology of how to live together, to 
build states and governments. The myth concludes with Zeus himself eventually giving 
man these techniques, and humanity flourishes ever after. 
From this myth we can glean a new way oflooking at technology, seeing it not 
simply as physical things, but as systems. Even seemingly simple, independent 
technologies imply a larger system of both physical and non-physical technologies. For 
example, a simple pocket watch can be viewed as a physical technological artefact in this 
materialistic conception of technology. This is certainly true. It is made of metal and 
glass and other materials, fashioned into springs, gears, cogs, and arms. But as an 
artefact, it also represents an integrative system. First, a watch is not atomic; it is a 
collection of parts. These parts must be carefully assembled in just such a way that they 
function properly. This logically implies the necessity for skilled craftspeople with highly 
specialised knowledge; in short, watchmakers. But even if a watch was very simple, like 
a sundial, made of one undivided piece, we would need some way to produce it in the 
first place. The knowledge that the watchmakers possess, that they learned from their 
parents, siblings, teachers, or fellow guild members, is technological knowledge. It refers 
to physical, technological artefacts, but it is still not identical or reducible to them. The 
knowledge of how all the pieces of a watch fit together, the finely tuned motor skills 
required to assemble such tiny parts, are highly developed technological skills separate 
from the watch itself. Further still, watchmakers cannot and would not exist if they could 
not dedicate a large part of their time, energy, and intellectual capacity to learning their 
trade and amassing all this technological knowledge. If watchmakers were also expected 
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to bake bread, clean chimneys, argue in court, and drive cabs, they would probably not be 
very accomplished in their trade. Equally true, even if they were not required to perform 
the duties, but were expected simply to be knowledgeable about other fields, especially 
advanced, highly scientific and technologised disciplines, our poor watchmakers would 
have their brains so full that there would scarcely be room for anything pertaining to 
watches. We therefore need some sort of societal organisation that allows for 
specialisation. We need social technologies that provide the division of labour. This 
organisation is itself a technique, a non-physical technology that creates the conditions 
for watch makers, cabbies, geologists, and doctors. I am not suggesting thatfirsl we must 
get our organisational technique straight and then can we set about specialising. The two 
processes occur organically at the same time, the one informing the other. In addition, it 
is important to note that besides the organisational technique, we also have as an end 
result something novel: the watchmaker, cabbie, or doctor. In short, the technician. 
A perfect (if fictionalised) example of this social organisation or hierarchy as 
technology is found in the Republic. In his search for a definition of justice, Plato via 
Socrates sets out to build the just state. The rationale behind this exercise is that, the state 
being very large, it will be more easily discernible what makes it just. The lessons learned 
from studying justice in the state can then be applied to the soul. What is interesting for 
our purposes is the step-by-step analysis Plato provides of the building of the state. 
Whether or not the state as described, with its tripartite structure of worker, guardian, and 
philosopher-king is actually practical in reality is irrelevant. Rather, the focus on the 
division of responsibility and labour, present already 2,500 years ago (and certainly 
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farther back still) is evidence of a technological approach to societal organisation. The 
imaginative Greek state builders arrange the parts, not watch springs or gears, but people 
with various duties and functions, into a coherent and functional whole. The finished 
state is a complex piece of technology, not at all unlike the watch. It is just in that 
everything is in its place; everyone has an assigned task which they fulfill. 
It is therefore evident that it is notjust the physical bits and pieces that go into a 
watch or a car that are technology. The know-how that allows those parts to be assembled 
at all, the conceptualised blueprint, and the operating organisational scheme are 
themselves technological. One last example will suffice to illustrate this point. In 
evaluating the strengths of the Greek hoplite soldiers, an analysis which only discussed 
their weapons, armour, and other equipment, all very obviously technological artefacts, 
would be incomplete. We need also to consider what strategies and tactics the Greeks had 
at their disposal. Not just what the hop lites fought with, but how they fought and who 
they were. The technologies of warfare employed by the hop lites include their battle 
formations, their use of the massed push or shove, even whether to wield the spear over-
or underhand. A chain of command must also be established, where the main battle plan 
is communicated from the officers to the rank-and-file soldier. The Spartans were famous 
among the Greeks for a highly integrated socio-technological program whose sole aim 
was the production of exceptional hoplite warriors and the structure itself of this society 
was a technological answer to the question of how to produce such fearsome warriors. 
The organisational structures found within a state or army or the technical 
knowledge required to build a watch are therefore just as much technology as the gadget 
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or technical device. Technology is thus pervasive to the degree that almost every human 
transaction involves a human-technology relation. I want therefore to explore the nature 
of these relations: specifically, the embodiment and hermeneutic properties of 
technology. 
2.4 Human-Technology Relations: Embodiment and Hermeneutic 
In this final section, I move to a more immediate, personal examination of 
technology using two distinctions provided by Don Ihde. Ihde is a phenomenologist and 
philosopher of technology in the Heideggerian, hermeneutic tradition. His books, 
Technology and the Lifeworld, and Technics and Practice rehearse a series of 
phenomenological examinations of the first-person experience of technology in use, what 
he calls "a phenomenology of human-technology relations." The intent of his 
examinations is to discover " the features of this ambiguous relation" (Lifeworld 72). To 
this end, he develops four types of human-technology relation, of which I will be looking 
at the first two, the embodiment and hermeneutic properties of technology. My main goal 
in examining this pair of distinctions brought forth by Ihde is to give us some tools to 
analyse how deeply technology affects space. 
The first human-technology relation is embodiment. When we embody 
technology or technics, we take the technology into our experience of the world. That is, 
the technology transforms our perception and bodily sense. The common example of this 
is of visual technologies. Jhde's scheme, 
1- glasses- world 
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represents the fact that the technology comes between the subject and object as mediator 
(Lifeworld 73). The eyeglasses allow the wearer to see the object, and it is only through 
(quite literally) the glasses that the seeing can take place. In this case, the technology 
itself is not the object of attention. The glasses should, again quite literally, be as 
transparent as possible to the user that they recede from her experience. Although I do not 
wear eyeglasses, I do wear sunglasses, and if the lenses are smudged or the frames so 
thick that they obtrude into my visual field, the experience of using that technology 
becomes a chore. To use Heidegger's terminology, the glasses become like the hammer 
with a broken handle. The hammer sticks out as an object: "It ceases to be the means of 
praxis and becomes an obtruding object defeating the work project" (lhde, Lifeworld 80). 
This is the core principle of human-technological interactions. Embodiment relations are 
only possible if the technology is transparent. Ihde offers this scheme as a representation 
of embodied technology: 
(!- glasses )- world. 
Here, the subject and the technology have become one, so to speak. My glasses "become 
part of the way I ordinarily experience my surroundings." Thus, "[t]echnics is the 
symbiosis of artefact and user within a human action" (Lifeworld 73). 
The astute reader will have noticed that the eyeglasses, when embodied, are no 
longer occurent or merely present-to-hand. There is no distinction, as in lhde's scheme, 
between the 'I' and the 'glasses', the user and tool, the subject and object. Human-
technology-world converge in being-in-the-world (this relation will be fully disclosed in 
the third and final chapter). For now, consider that the glasses, when first worn and the 
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user is not used to them, are still occurent or present-to-hand. A technology or technique 
is thus fully mastered when it disappears to the greatest possible extent from our 
awareness of it as object; that is, when it becomes part of the structure of experience and 
not the content. 
lhde's eyeglasses are a very personal and proximally close technology. They only 
function when they sit on the user's face. As such it is easier to see how they are 
assimilated into the subject's experience and sink into her body image. Further, they do 
not offer new or drastically different powers to the user, rather they restore as much as 
possible the natural sight of the subject. They are also a very simple, monosensory 
technology. But an embodiment relation can take place with technologies that are very 
complex by comparison, and afford "whole-body motility" such as driving a car 
(Lifeworld 74). For every Ieamer, the first experience of driving a car is clumsy, self-
conscious, and usually nerve-wracking. Conscious effort and attention is directed towards 
pushing the pedals just right, turning the wheel precisely, and strictly obeying traffic 
signs. As a student improves, the movements become more coordinated and jerky starts, 
stops, and turns become smoother. Parallel parking strikes terror in the hearts of novice 
drivers, and even some seasoned ones. But when well learned, as Ihde points out, the 
driver 'feels' rather than sees the curb at such-and-such a distance from the driver-car's 
body (74-75). The body image, thus, "is not fixed but malleably extendable and/or 
reducible in terms of the material or technological mediations that may be embodied" 
(lhde, Lifeworld 74). 
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There are countless other illustrations, only limited by imagination. A well-worn 
example, used by Wittgenstein, Polanyi, Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus, and now myself, is of 
the blind man's cane: 
We hand the blind man a cane and ask him to tell us what properties it has. After 
hefting and feeling it, he tells us that it is light, smooth, about three feet long, and 
so on; it is occurent (present-at-hand] for him. But when the man starts to 
manipulate the cane, he loses his awareness of the cane itself; he is aware only of 
the curb (or whatever object the cane touches); or, if all is going well, he is not 
even aware of that, but of his freedom to walk, or perhaps only what he is talking 
about with a friend. Precisely when it is most genuinely appropriated equipment 
becomes transparent (Dreyfus 65). 
The myopic woman's glasses and the blind man's cane are two very different 
technologies, but they ultimately serve the same function: to allow the user to perceive 
the world. More deeply, they allow the user to extend their spatial presence in the world, 
bringing objects into and closer to consciousness. Deeper still, I propose a modification 
to Ihde 's scheme: the intersection ofl-glasses-world should be represented as: 
(I -glasses-world) 
These are not three distinct entities; rather, they are all bound together in the mutual 
process of being-in-the-world. 
Ihde's second human-technology relation is the hermeneutic. This involves 
'reading' or interpreting a technology. The technology becomes an object, not a 
Heideggerian object, but a written text to be deciphered. Ihde states that "writing is a 
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technologically embedded form of language" and I agree (Lifeworld 81 ). But language 
itself is also a technology, a means of conveying information. 5 Take the example of the 
thermometer, as Ihde does. Before its invention, we had no quantitative measurement of 
temperature. We could go outside andfeel the cold or heat. If we want to relay 
information about the temperature to another person, we engage in the first hermeneutic 
transformation, and we need a technology to do so. So we invent qualitative statements 
such as, "It's cold outside" or, "The fire is hot." Then we got more creative with our 
language, introducing 'tepid,' 'lukewarm,' and ' scalding' into our vocabulary. These 
utterances transform a first-person spatiotemporal experience of the world into a 
communicative act. As hermeneut, you have to interpret my saying, "The soup is really 
hot!" or "It's really cold outside." My conception of hot and cold might be quite different 
from yours, and my warnings that you should bundle up might not be the best advice. 
When we introduce the thermometer, we add a level of refinement that did not 
previously exist. The concept of temperature as an accurately measurable quantity has as 
much to do with the technology itself as the phenomenon it measures. That is to say that 
the phenomenon of temperature was not out in the world all along, waiting to be 
discovered. The technological means of measuring molecular motion (temperature) in 
part created temperature. With thermometer in hand, I no longer need to tell you that it's 
hot or cold outside. I can give you simple measurement: "It's 12 degrees out"- you 
decide whether you need a jacket. 
5 And not necessarily in the form of propositional content. "Ouch!" and "Yahoo!!" also carry information: 
pain and excitement. 
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The key to the hermeneutic transformation is that, unlike embodiment relations, 
the instrument itself is what is perceived, and through the instrument I read the state of 
affairs to which it refers (Lifeworld 86). The point of the eyeglasses is to look through 
them, not at them. This is reversed in hermeneutics: I no longer need to go outside and 
feel the hot or cold; I simply look at my thermometer hanging outside (actually, I check 
the weather network). Therefore, Ihde diagrams the hermeneutic relation thusly (86): 
I-( thermometer-world) 
Or more generally: 
Human-( technology-world) 
Notice in this scheme the movement of the brackets to surround (technology-world) 
rather than (human-technology). Within the brackets, there is a potential for a 
malfunction between the technology and the world it refers to, what Ihde terms the 
"enigma position." Certainly, a malfunction in the form of a misreading can occur 
between the human and the (technology-world), but this can be made conscious and 
corrected. Observer ignorant of internal malfunction. The is the internal 'enigma' 
between technology and world. There is an opacity between human and (technology-
world) that is not always resolvable. If the instrument does not correctly refer " its 
reference object or its world cannot be present" (lhde, Lifeworld 87). This is especially 
critical if direct confirmation of the proper functioning of the device is impossible. 
As an example, let us consider whether or not the Moon is in fact made of green 
cheese. Having experienced green cheese on Earth, I might seek visual confirmation by 
inspecting the Moon through a telescope. [fit does its job properly, the telescope brings 
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the distant Moon closer, and what I see is the Moon. This is not trivial, because I do not 
want my observations to be affected by chromatic aberrations or fuzzy images caused by 
an inferior instrument. Thus, to fully embody the technology and extend my vision over a 
great distance, the telescope needs to be a good one. 
But suppose that my visual inspection proves inconclusive, and I decide that what 
I really need is a chemical analysis of the Moon's composition. So I send a lunar probe to 
the Moon' s surface to take a core sample. I equip it with a radio transmitter, and after 
touching down, acquiring a sample, and performing the chemical analysis, the probe 
transmits the data back to my lab on Earth. I do not now have in my possession a hunk of 
Moon to smell and taste, but a coloured spectrograph representing the chemical makeup 
of the Moon, still hundreds of thousands of kilometres away. But the information that 
will ultimately prove or disprove my hypothesis that the Moon is made of green cheese is 
much, much closer; it is right in front of me, on my computer screen. If all is functioning 
properly, then I can read the text of the printout and infer what the Moon is made of. In 
this example, I can even compare the data to a similar analysis of Earth green cheese and 
see if the spectrographs agree. 
But now I am going to introduce a kink: on the way to the Moon, the probe is 
bombarded with cosmic rays that knock the chemical analyser out of whack. The data 
that it transmits back to Earth is corrupt. There is a breakdown in the (technology-world) 
relation, but I have no idea that this is the case. All I have to go by is the chart, and the 
malfunctioning technology is opaque to me. My reading of the Moon' s composition is 
inaccurate, not because of any failing on my part, but because of this malfunction 
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(assume I am adept at reading such spectrographs)6. I could in principle fly to the Moon, 
extract another sample, and this time eat it to confirm the technology's results. But 
practically, for me, this is impossible. My worldview is thus wrong; I now believe, 
falsely, that the Moon is made of green cheese. 
This view is certainly not incorrigible. Further tests and technologies could 
rehabilitate my beliefs; however, this is not always the case. As I said, in principle I 
could retrieve a chunk of Moon, spread it on a cracker, and taste it. But there are many 
domains in which any sort of direct confirmation is in principle impossible. This is where 
we see technologies at their most powerful in introducing new modes of experience, and 
it is on this idea that I will conclude. 
lhde refers to vertical and horizontal trajectories of transformation (Lifeworld 78, 
90). The telescope is a horizontal transformation of our already existing visual 
experience. It makes things bigger, making distant objects visible or more detailed. A 
horizontal transformation denotes that the object being perceived or acted upon does not 
fundamentally change in character. With the telescope, the object appears larger, but as 
Ihde suggests, it still maintains a spatial isomorphism to the un-enhanced perception 
(imagine zooming in on a planet with greater levels of magnification). A vertical 
transformation is like that of the above chemical spectrograph, or of spectrographic 
astronomy. The image of the spectrograph is only very tenuously analogous to the object, 
either moon rock or star. In the case of a star, a spectrograph translates a many-light-
years-distant, massive three-dimensional object into a coloured band on paper or a screen. 
6 That is to say, assume that I am a technician, one who has mastered a set of technologies. To the 
uninitiated, the colours mean nothing; they are not part of their world. 
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There is little remaining spatial isomorphism between the read-out and the star as there is 
with a telescope image. Taken one step further, the star can be translated and represented 
as pure digital information, an elaborate sequence of ones and zeroes, which now has no 
spatial isomorphism whatsoever (Ihde, Lifeworld 90-91 ). The star is present in different 
ways depending on which technology is used to ' look' at it, whether it be through the 
spectrographic band, the telescope, or a digital printout. 
Therefore the main idea to take away from this chapter and point us to the next is 
that technology plays a vital role in our constitution of the world. Examples of 
embodiment relations such as eyeglasses or seeing canes show us how technology 
structures space. They also demonstrate how dependent we are on technology: without 
the cane, the blind man would really be blind. Hermeneutic relations are a bit more 
opaque and they do not necessarily yield spatial experiences (as when we transform the 
star into an expression of ones and zeroes). But the example of the green cheese bears out 
the point that hermeneutics still structure our world: Although in principle possible, 
realistically speaking, I cannot fly to the Moon and taste a piece of it to confirm whether 
or not it is made of cheese. Thus I am entirely dependent on whatever technology is 
going to tell me about how the world is. Or to put it another way, (and the thermometer 
makes this point as well): technology defines my world. And as my diagram suggests, me 
with it. It is an ontology of the subjects, objects, concepts, and ideas of the world. The 




Technology and Space as Being-in-the-World 
This third and final chapter will gather the threads of the preceding chapters and 
focus on being-in-the-world. The argument consists of three interrelated points: 
• Space is a mode ofbeing-in-the-world. 
• Technology greatly affects our experience and having of space. 
• Thus, technology shapes our being-in-the-world because it shapes the way 
we have space. 
There is an interrelationship between self, technology, and world (in this case, the 
spatiality of the world) that I wish to outline here and that will ultimately demonstrate 
that our way of being-in-the-world is profoundly technological. Our spatiality is 
structured through technology and more generally, our life experience. 
Having argued in chapter one that space is a mode of being-in-the-world, and 
having outlined what technology is in chapter two, my last task is to demonstrate how 
technology affects the way we constitute space. In claiming that it has such an effect, I 
am also in fact arguing that technology itself is a mode of being-in-the-world, that as 
Dasein we employ technology not just instrumentally, but ontically. That is to say that 
technology plays an integral role in the constitution of our world, in the creation of what 
there is. 
I will begin with an examination of the interesting case of Cheryl Schiltz, a 
woman whose sense of balance was lost and eventually restored through medical 
technology. I will then move to an examination of a different family oftechnologies: 
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modes of transportation. These examples are meant to illustrate the plasticity of lived 
space, very different than the fixity of scientific space. My discussion will then move to 
the general implications of technology for Dasein. To be-in-the-world is in part to have 
space. Space is not something pre-existing that we simply experience; it is a structure of 
our experience, and further, it is a structure that is moulded through technological means. 
In the creation and use of technology, the nature ofthe human-space-world relation is 
determined. 
3.1 The intriguing case of Cheryl Schiltz 
As I argued in chapter one, space is a mode of being-in-the-world. Specifically, I 
am dealing with bodily, lived space. Clearly this requires a body. But what constitutes a 
body? It is obvious by this point that the body is not limited to the biological body Nature 
has endowed us with. To varying degrees, the blind man's cane, the motorist's car, or the 
cochlear implant of a deaf woman are assimilated, embodied, to become part of the body 
image and ultimately part of the self. The brain projects a body-shaped image onto our 
actual body, but this image is not the organic body itself. The brain can be made to 
project an image that is different than the physical body. This is the problem of the 
phantom limb, where although there are no actual tissue or pain receptors, the amputee 
can feel their limb in space and feel pain in it. "People with actual limbs don't usually 
realize this, because the body image of our limbs are perfectly projected onto our actual 
limbs, making it impossible to distinguish our body image from our body" (Doidge 188). 
However, the body image can be expanded to include inanimate objects, like the seeing 
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cane, whereby the blind man feels the curb as if he were touching it, for in fact, he is. In 
The Brain That Changes Itself, for example, Doidge describes how he was made to 
assimilate a tabletop into his body image: 
Then Ramachandran performed an even simpler trick. He told me to put my right 
hand under the table, so my hand was hidden. Then he tapped the tabletop with 
one hand, while with his other he tapped mine under the table, where I couldn't 
see it, in an identical rhythm. When he moved the spot where he hit the tabletop, a 
bit to the left or right, he moved his hand under the table exactly the same way. 
After a few minutes I stopped experiencing him as tapping my hand under the 
table and instead- fantastic as it sounds-started to feel that the body image of 
my hand had merged with the tabletop, so that the sensation of being tapped 
seemed to come from the tabletop ( 190). 
This experiment and the experience of the blind person or motorist show that the bodily 
space we inhabit is not strictly circumscribed by the limits of the biological body but is 
malleable and can be extended. One way to do this is through technology by assimilating 
objects into the lived body that in tum alter our constitution of space. 
This is demonstrated dramatically in the case of Cheryl Schiltz. It epitomises our 
ability to change not just ourselves but specifically our sense of space through 
technology. It also draws together various threads of our discussion of the body, lived 
space, and embodiment and hermeneutic relations. Briefly, Cheryl's vestibular apparatus, 
the three semicircular canals in the inner ear, was almost totally destroyed by a post-
operative over-administration of the antibiotic, gentamicin. Gentacimin is known to have 
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this side effect in excessive dosages and in Cheryl's unfortunate case, it left her with only 
two percent of the vestibular function. The vestibular apparatus detects motion in three-
dimensions and gives us our sense of orientation. Without it, Cheryl's sense of balance 
was obliterated; she could no longer orient herself in space and she felt like she was 
constantly falling. Cheryl was a Wobbler, the name sufferers of this unfortunate affliction 
call themselves. Miraculously, a new technology restored her sense of balance, but not by 
replacing or repairing the vestibular apparatus in the ear. Rather, Paul Bach-y-Rita, a 
pioneer in the field of neuroplasticity, developed a device that consists of an 
accelerometer attached to a helmet and wired to a thin strip of electrodes that is placed on 
the tongue. As the wearer of the device moves their head, the accelerometer sends signals 
to the electrode, and the wearer experiences a tingling sensation moving across the 
tongue, mirroring the motion of the head. Eventually, the wearer learns to associate the 
location of the tingling on their tongue with their position in space. So if the head is tilted 
forward and to the left, the electrodes fire on the front-left part of the tongue (Doidge 2-
6). 
This technology is an example of both an embodiment and hermeneutic relation 
in the sense I have explained them in chapter two. In fact, we can understand these 
relations as the mechanism by which we assimilate technology into our lived body and 
hence into our experience of lived space. As embodiment relation, the balance device 
transforms the perceptual, bodily sense. You must imagine yourself using the device and 
how it feels if you are to fully appreciate the power of this transformation. When you tilt 
your head, at first you feel only tingling moving on your tongue. As you move your head 
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back and forth, the tingling moves back and forth. When you tilt to the left, the tingling 
moves left, and so for the right. At this stage you are a hermeneut, reading the signals and 
consciously performing the transposition. But at some point, the tingling on your tongue 
becomes more than just that. Your brain begins to reinterpret the signals it is receiving, 
correlating the position of your head with the position on your tongue of the electrode 
stimulus. After trying out the device, Doidge reports: "I soon forget that the sensory 
information is coming from my tongue and can read where I am in space" (6). This is the 
same experience the blind man from chapter one must have when he first begins to 
master the use of the 'seeing' cane. 
What is most remarkable about Bach-y-Rita's device is that the sensations on the 
tongue cease to be objects of perception, the content of experience, and become the form 
of spatial structuring or organisation. The sensations on the tongue cease to be discrete, 
conscious events that are the focus of our attention. They are like a fly bite that stops 
itching only after we forget about it. The technology vanishes and the user is in a world in 
which she can balance herself and move about in space. This is not at all dissimilar from 
the natural experience of vision. No one feels light impinging on their retinas; they see an 
object. Bach-y-Rita's balancing device, like the eye, becomes the mechanism through 
which one can have a spatial world. This process is largely taken for granted until we 
encounter pathological cases of people who lack the right equipment. In healthy humans, 
this equipment is biological and it buys us spatial experience; it allows us to be-in-the-
world spatially. If the vestibular apparatus is damaged or destroyed, we lose this faculty, 
but as Cheryl ' s case demonstrates, it can be restored technologically. In other words, we 
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can use a different device (Bach-y-Rita's helmet instead of the semicircular inner-ear 
canals) to constitute lived space. 
This example leads to my next main point, that technology greatly affects our 
having of space. The technology of Bach-y-Rita's helmet restored space for Cheryl. This 
represents a profound transformation of her experience: she went from being a depressed, 
despairing "Wobbler" whose world was chaotic, to being a comfortable, happy, balanced 
individual. The goal ofBach-y-Rita's research and his device was to return the patient as 
close as possible to biological normalcy of function. But we can easily imagine a 
technological alteration or 'upgrade' to our biology that would give us a different spatial 
experience. This technology could come in many different forms, and in the following 
section, I will focus on how different methods of transportation lead to differing 
constitutions of space. 
3.2 Getting there: Transportation technology 
Take the old objective of travel. Railroads and ocean liners are relevantly 
different from the stage coach and from the sailing ship, not merely in 
construction and efficiency but in the very feel of the user, making travel a 
different experience altogether, something one may do for its own sake. 
Airplanes, finally, leave behind any similarity with former conveyances, except 
the purpose of getting from here to there, with no experience of what lies in 
between (Jonas 25). 
60 
Jonas' observations on travel technology are provocative and they point in the right 
direction, but they do not go far enough. It is true that new technology is relevantly 
different ... not merely in construction and efficiency but in the very feel of the user. The 
phenomenological experience of using the technology, be it of transport or otherwise, 
represents something entirely novel and the technology offers a new set of possibilities 
and sometimes dramatic actions. But further still and more fundamentally, this also 
means that the world of the user and the user him or herself is changed in conjunction 
with the technology. Specifically, space is constituted radically differently. In keeping 
with Jonas' observations, I will take some time to examine four modes of transportation, 
from the mundane to the fantastical, to show that progressively more advanced methods 
of transport are not simply more efficient at moving us through space, but they contribute 
to a different constitution of space itself. As I progress from one example to the next, 
keep in mind the character of lived space that I have been discussing: not a scientific 
quantity of distance that must be travelled, but a spatial network of objects and places of 
interest that can be made present to a subject. 
The subway 
In my travels, I am always delighted and confused by subway transportation7• The 
subterranean world oftunnels, tracks, and ticket booths is in stark contrast to the city 
above. Upon entering the subway station, this mirror world that exists solely to defeat 
distance more efficiently than above-ground transportation, one disappears and re-
emerges on the other side of town. There is no experience of the in-between of the above-
7 Which Lewis Mumford lovingly refers to as "the extravagant mechanical devices ... which were built in 
response to the disorganization and speculative chaos of the megalopolis" Technics and Civilization 426. 
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ground city compared to walking, taking the bus or tram, even driving (Backhaus' much-
derided mode of transport). Indeed, many deem this a blessing and it is largely the point 
of taking the subway. Nevertheless, it engenders a different experience of the relation 
between places. As I sit on the subway and stare at the transit map, whizzing along 
beneath the city streets, I must perform the hermeneutic translation of trying to figure out 
just where exactly I'm going to end up. Reading the intersecting multi-coloured lines on 
the map is an acquired skill, no different from my attempt to figure out the lines of the 
spectrograph. Walking around downtown connects locations in my head via my bodily 
action: motion through space. When I take the subway, I frequently stagger back out into 
the light and it takes a few moments, and a few wrong turns, before I re-establish my 
location. Of course, one can learn this new mode of space, integrating the subway and 
city worlds into a new, cohesive map, just as one can learn to decipher a spectrograph. 
The airplane 
Similar to the subway, one disappears into the airplane. Unless the passenger has 
a window seat, they do not see the landscape pass. At any rate, no one, window seat or 
not, sees the landscape and they certainly do not experience it once above the clouds. 
Travel time is significantly reduced from all other modes of transport. In combination, 
these factors modify our relation to spaces. Flying from New York to London takes mere 
hours. There are no geographical impediments (besides some weather/turbulence) and no 
contact with the in-between. Thus flying is a sort oflevelling of the experience of travel; 
besides variation in the time of flight, there is little different about flying to Paris than to 
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------ --------------- ------------------------
Tokyo. As an exaggeration of the subway, we disappear into one terminal and reappear in 
another, hundreds or thousands of kilometres away. Space contracts, distance becomes 
less relevant; journeys are easier and thus more frequent, the associated cost, risks, and 
investment of time being much reduced. 
The teletransporter 
Let me indulge now in a little speculation, science fiction even, and depart from 
real-world examples. Picture a teletransporter as it is usually conceived in the bold 
imaginings of our science fiction. The traveller steps into one pod or platform and 
emerges on another, perhaps close by, perhaps vastly distant. Like the airplane, there is 
no in-between experience. The teleporter is the extreme manifestation of physically 
moving oneself through space, abolishing distance to the utmost. This creates a 
disconnected network of nodes that I can jump between, with no need (or perhaps 
possibility) of ever discovering or exploring the zones in-between. All space becomes a 
series of places-the destination, not the journey. With automobility, we saw through 
Backhaus' examination that auto routes create a network of destinations we are invited, 
even forced to visit.8 With the transporter, we can push this to the extreme, where all 
places are pre-defined and equally available instantaneously. Space in this instance would 
be severely modified. There would be no bodily sensation or feeling of how far apart 
things are, unlike the airplane which retains a vestige of this: the accelerations and 
decelerations of take-off and landing, turbulence, and the time it takes to travel. Indeed, 
8 If there is no road, I can't go there, and maybe I don't even want to. 
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in terms of my definition of space, it no longer makes sense to speak of the 'distance' 
between places as a measured quantity. The only relevant criterion is in what relation I 
can put myself to those places and their objects, to make them present to me. 
The digital universe 
The most speculative of all and fullest transformation of space is in imagining a 
fully digitised universe. We might picture a scenario in which all human minds are 
downloaded onto computer hardware, a vision I might add that is not my own wild 
speculation but one that is seriously held and defended by Ray Kurzweil and Nick 
Bostrom, to name only two of its supporters (Bostrom, Kurzweil). In this vision, humans 
and computers have merged in something called the Singularity. Computerised implants 
in the body and brain slowly augment and replace our organic biological processes until 
the line between computer and human being is erased. Ultimately, so the vision goes, we 
may depart from our physical bodies and upload our selves onto a computer (Kurzweil 
198-202). What this would look and feel like is certainly hard to imagine, but just in 
terms of transportation, of 'getting there,' I think we can profitably compare this 
experience to something we do quite naturally on the internet, that is, jump from webpage 
to webpage, following one hyper! ink after another at our whim. Imagine if your entire 
world was like this. If you want to enjoy a nice meal at a fancy restaurant, you could load 
up a restaurant program of some sort. Instantly, all of your senses would be engaged with 
the sights, sounds, odours, tastes, and bodily feeling of being at that restaurant. To go 
shopping, you load up the mall program, and you immediately have total access to a vast 
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array of goods which you can pick up, try on, taste, etc. You would also have 
instantaneous access to a host of data on each product, from manufacturer specs to other 
user's comments. After making a purchase, perhaps you would bounce over to the Moon 
to enjoy a moonwalk in your new sneakers. Unfettered by a physical body in ' real' space, 
you would not need a slow and expensive space shuttle to get there, or a cumbersome 
space suit to protect you. For that matter, why not live on the Moon? 
Fantastical, to be sure, but something like this is already happening with our 
current computer technology. A myriad of online programs allow users to live alternative 
existences. From World ofWarcraft to Second Life and the Sims, there are many new 
modes of experience to be enjoyed on the Internet. By day my computer is my office. All 
of my documents and files are stored on my hard drive, neatly arranged in folders. When 
I start up my web browser and visit Amazon or eBay, the computer is now my shopping 
mall. And when I really want to escape the physical limitations of my computer room, I 
can fire up Second Life, a 3-D digital online world, where I happen to be a real estate 
agent, selling vittual property and making a real profit (Weeks). In some variations of 
Second Life that use maps of the real world and not the fantasy island of Linden, I can be 
a 500 kilometre-tall giant and walk across the Earth's continents, fly alongside the Space 
Shuttle, or stand inside a weather map (Roush). If that isn't dramatic enough for my taste, 
in World ofWarcraft, a popular online fantasy-themed game, I can utterly transform 
myself from a simple masters student into Falcor, Defender of the Alliance, travel across 
the imaginary land of Azeroth, and slay mythical monsters for fame and fortune in a 
fuller realisation of the escapism of fantasy novels and films. 
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The networked computer is what allows for this dramatic transformation of my 
life experience, magnifying my possibilities and creating new spaces of action. Like the 
Renaissance guildsman of chapter one, my home office is but one region of action. I do 
not physically move my body through coordinate space when I visit Amazon and buy a 
book. Nor do I dress up as a dwarf and travel to a mythical land. But each of these 
regions places a new set of options, possibilities for action before me. To return to 
Heideggerian parlance, the computer and the worlds created and accessed by it make 
available a new set of equipment, or a new framework in which I exist as Dasein. This 
process, deseverance, has nothing to do with quantified measurements of space. How far 
away is Azeroth? How far between Azeroth and Linden? Could you plot them all on the 
same map? Are they actually, physically real? Of course not, but that is hardly the point. 
My actual experience of these worlds is what counts, the circumspective experience of 
moving through them, interacting with their objects, and pursuing my goals. Thus lived 
spatiality exists in a scientifically non-spatial realm. A "3-0" computer simulation 
presents us with a world or object that appears to be in three-dimensional space. Of 
course, this is an illusion. In Second Life, people build virtual buildings. But I can't plot 
on a map of the real world where those buildings are. The entire digital realm is 'flat' with 
respect to measured distance. The files that I store on my computer's hard drive are 
similarly 'flat'. Though we speak of files and folders these are hermeneutic 
transformations. The actual data consists of 1 s and Os. We speak of how much 'space' we 
have on a drive, how much data we can 'fit' into it. And to an extent, this is accurate, 
because the drive's physical structure is indeed in space, and the amount of data it can 
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hold is limited by its physical dimensions (amongst other things). But notice the 
difference between a hard drive's platter and the virtual world that my computer 
represents to me, perhaps hundreds of kilometres in size, with spatial dimensions 
analogous to my real world experience. Where does all this space come from? It comes 
from us and it represents our ability and desire to move through this space, to perform 
actions within it and make it meaningful. My cat has no idea what I'm doing as I sit in 
front of a flat screen. The most that interests him about it is the movement of the mouse 
cursor, and even that has lost its novelty. 
3.3 Galileo and the loss of the heavens 
The role technology plays in constituting our world and especially the spatiality of 
that world is further evidenced when we consider some historical examples. The 
conception the Greeks had of the 'heavenly spheres' was based on a theoretical, proto-
scientific worldview. This theory rendered the stars and planets as part of the heavens, on 
a different plane of existence than the Earth, and ultimately inaccessible to humans. The 
Greeks did not believe that the stars were simply spatially distant from the Earth, that 
they could one day approach them merely by travelling the distance between the Earth 
and the stars. This also entails that they did not believe the stars were within their realm 
of action. The heavenly bodies were occurent in the Greek worldview, but not available. 
That is to say that the Greeks could not make themselves present to these stars, could not 
occupy the same space and interact with the stars as part of their world. Many years later, 
Galileo shook the scientific and religious communities of his day when he confirmed, 
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through the technology of the telescope, that the moon was not a perfect sphere, that its 
surface was in fact pitted and jagged. Besides the fallout from the Catholic Church, this 
discovery contributed significantly to a shift in perception and experience of space. 
Suddenly, the perfect celestial bodies were confirmed to be of the same stuff as the Earth, 
and the space separating them from us was no longer qualitatively different or special. 
There was no longer a difference in kind, a conceptual gap between us and the heavens. 9 
This is an example of what I call the 'spatial aspirations' of a culture or society 
being altered. The technology a society has in part shapes its possibilities of action in 
space. The Greeks looked at the heavenly bodies and did not see stars and planets they 
might one day visit. Similarly, in ancient Rome, when a son went off to war for eight 
years, he effectively disappeared, only present through infrequent and slow-moving 
letters. His family's expectation of communication was greatly reduced compared to 
now, when we have many instantaneous and sensory-rich communication technologies: 
telephone, email, instant messages, and video conferencing make distant people present 
to us. Certainly, this not the same type of presence as if they were actually here with us, 
face-to-face. As lhde points out, like the glasses, the telephone is an example of an 
embodiment relationship. The telephone ought to recede into the background to be an 
effective instrument. It obtrudes as an object, defeating our attempts at communication, 
when there is a poor connection, the battery runs out, or the signal drops. But even when 
the telephone is working perfectly, "the ordinary multidimensioned presence of a face-to-
face encounter does not occur" (Ihde, Lifeworld 78). The experience of using a telephone 
9 Kant's noumenal world is in principle outside our domain of experience, not just 'a long ways off but not 
even in space. 
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exhibits similar properties as the face-to-face encounter, but it also brings a new kind of 
spatiality with relevant differences: 
[T]he spatial significations are changed .. .It makes little difference whether you 
are geographically near or far, none at all whether you are north or south ... This 
telephonic distance is different both from immediate face-to-face encounters and 
from visual or geographical distance normally taken (78) . 
In desevering distance, the telephone thus does not care, so to speak, about a 
geographical, measurable space. It creates its own space within which the conversing 
parties meet. So long as the transmission is clean and lag-free, I could be talking to my 
next-door neighbour, no more than a dozen metres away, or a distant friend, halfway 
across the world. The phenomenological experience of the telephone call is identical in 
either case (though the subject matter and my relative excitement may add their own 
character to the conversation). Ifl do not have access to a telephone, or if it has not yet 
been invented, I cannot engage in certain actions and potentialities. 
This phone space of near-distance is something unique and only accessible 
through the mediating power of the technology. The telephone and its associated system 
of cables, radio towers, operators, and telecom providers describe a world and a way of 
life that allows and invites certain actions; likewise with transportation technology and 
with Galileo 's telescope and his astronomical theory. I chose these examples specifically 
to highlight how the constitution of space is deeply affected by whatever technology 
happens to be going. But I also chose them to show how in shaping space these 
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technologies have an impact on our being-in-the-world. This is to say that not only lived-
space but our life experience is technological. 
The telephone example is particularly apt because it very obviously involves 
action at a distance. The ability to transmit and receive messages over long distances, 
instantaneously, is an absolutely world-changing phenomenon. Heidegger's peculiar 
notion of deseverance explains how we transcend space in this fashion, and it is thus on 
that note that I will conclude. 
3.4 Deseverance and Presence 
Deseverance is to bring something near, to abolish distance. But not necessarily to 
bring something near physically (i.e. its particles, mass, matter). We desever the 
newspaper when we pick it up in our hands or walk towards it. But we desever the news 
when we read the paper. We could listen to the same news item read over the radio, or 
cried in the town square, or see the images on a television broadcast. The technology 
itself, the gadgetry, is not the point. The effect of deseverance is the point and the mode 
of deseverance will vary according to the technology employed. Visual images, the radio 
report, or the print story each convey a different sense of the event. The important thing 
about the media technologies, however, is their similarity to each other, and to all the 
other forms of technology I have been discussing. When I say that deseverance is to 
abolish distance, I am not talking about the physical, measurable, scientific quantity of 
the space. Rather, I am talking about the making present of self to world and world to 
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self. It is at this fundamental level that we find technology's power, in revealing actions, 
potentialities and perceptions of Dasein that can turn out now one way and now another. 
It was not so long ago that we did not have the ability to surf the Net, or record 
and broadcast high-definition images with sound, or print still photographs and 
newspaper copy, or hop on a jet and fly across the world, or scribble a note to oneself 
with a pen and paper, or write at all, or communicate with language, or think(?). 
Technology has had an enormous impact on our world. It has created the world we live 
in at the same time that it has shaped us. What a telescope, whether optical or radio, and a 
microscope have in common with a television broadcast, and a hydroelectric dam on the 
Rhine, is that they all bring close perceptions of and possibilities for action in the world. 
The excitement or horror of the news story, or the knowledge of astronomy and quantum 




Our ability to create models- virtual realities- in our brains, combined with our 
modest-looking thumbs, has been sufficient to usher in another form of evolution: 
technology. That development enabled the persistence of the accelerating pace 
that started with biological evolution. 
We were the first species on Earth to combine a cognitive function and an 
effective opposable appendage (the thumb), so we were able to create technology 
that would extend our own horizons (Kurzweil 433, 487). 
In closing, I would like to return to my discussion of computer technology and a 
digitised universe: My argument has been that we are not ready-made human selves with 
predefined goals and desires. Part of Kurzweil 's vision echoes this idea, that through 
enhanced technology we will not simply be the same types of beings, only with more 
things to do and more ways to do them in the digital world. Rather, what it is to be human 
will be profoundly altered. Along with the digitisation of our selves comes a massive 
increase in the potential for action and perception in the world, thanks to computers 
millions of times more powerful than a biological brain. It is hard to fathom how different 
human experience would be if we were all a million times more intelligent than any of 
our geniuses. With almost limitless processing power, our minds could entertain many 
ideas, pursue a multitude of activities, and interact with other minds, all simultaneously. 
This could seriously call into question the idea of a self, if our thoughts as patterns of 
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knowledge were free to mix and mingle with those of others, there being no barriers of 
communication as mundane as brains locked within craniums. This would also 
profoundly alter our constitution of space and it could entirely lose its apparent character 
of being a three-dimensional grid in which we find ourselves and objects. Our being-in-
the-world is defined by limits, by the interplay of what is available, what is merely 
occurent, and what is occluded or removed from our experience. People, objects, and 
ideas could be ever present, thus never removed or distant from consciousness. This is the 
key: Everything could be equally available, in the Heideggerian sense. 
It is a simple fact of physics and biology that I cannot communicate unaided with 
someone on the other side of the globe. lf I have no possibility of action, whatever is on 
the other side of the globe is not available to me, does not exist in my space or constitute 
part of my world. Some technologies and the knowledge they produce require more 
drastic retellings and reinterpretations of the world. A Medieval monk did not believe he 
could travel at one-hundred kilometres an hour (he couldn't). He did not expect to see the 
Earth from space or communicate instantly with his family in a distant town (he didn't). 
Yet all of these actions are spheres (spaces!) of potentiality and actuality for us, though 
they are utterly closed to the monl<. More advanced technology grants us these abilities, 
and thus the mental expectations that these things are not only desirable, but possible. 
Quite easily done, even! Technologies create a certain mentality, a set of expectations 
and rules about the world that we follow because we know of no further possibilities. 
When Edison invented the light bulb, in one way or another, he willed there to be a world 
that was illuminated by electricity, day and night. When Oppenheimer worked on the 
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Manhattan project, he thought: 'Let there be a world in which a single bomb can 
devastate a city. Let there be a world in which I am become Death.' Before these 
technologies of illumination and destruction, those worlds were not available. 
As Dasein, we beings have an organizational structure of experience. One of these 
structures is space. The things we experience are arranged into objects of significance. 
Sensations of colour and edges are turned into tables and sabre-toothed tigers. Biology 
takes us so far; the operations ofthe brain that turn Hume's atoms of sensation into 
objects are largely unconscious processes. Things appear to us as above, below, 
underneath, but also impossibly high or dangerously close, as they relate to our interests 
(perhaps of not being killed). We are tempted to abstract this lived sensation into 
something we call objective space and baptise this as the way the world is, but this is a 
mistake. Space is a way to be-in-the-world. As we have progressed beyond biology, we 
have used technology to shape that space and thus our being-in-the-world. Technology is 
therefore a second structure of experience, which is to say that it is a mode of presence. 
To make myself present to you, I might write a letter and send it across the globe. It no 
longer matters if you are here next to me (in 'objective' space) to share a face-to-face 
experience. You are present in a new mode, mediated by written language and the 
vagaries of the postal service, and this presence is a technological achievement. 
Human beings are therefore the types of creatures that define themselves through 
technology. Our different technologies are literally what allow us to be-in-the-world in 
certain modes that are otherwise impossible. Animals have ways to be in the world too, 
claws, eyes and ears, smell, that are determined by the natural endowments they have 
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received from evolution. Humans are no different in that respect, except that our gifts 
include a complex brain. From this we create novel technologies of our own devising, 
some which radically alter our being-in-the-world and the structure of space. Unlike the 
animal, which due to the naturally evolved technologies it possesses is more or less stuck 
in one way of being, we humans have a certain, even a great, degree of control (though 
not always conscious!) over the technologies that we adopt and through which we define 
our being. The structure of lived space as a mode being-in-the-world, the self, and the 
world are all radically altered by technology. 
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